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WHO'S AFRAID OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM?
RECONCEPTUALIZING A TRADITIONAL PARADIGM
IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIALIZED DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURT PROGRAMS
[T]he judge, who decides in view of particular cases, and with reference to
problems absolutely concrete, ought, in adherence to the spirit of our modern
organization, and in order to escape the dangers of arbitrary action, to disen-
gage himself, so far as possible, of every influence that is personal or comes
from the particular situation which is presented to him, and base his judicial
decision on elements of an objective nature.
-Benjamin N. Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process"1
I. INTRODUCTION
Sarah is a thirty-two-year-old dental assistant. She has been married to Nathan,
a contractor, for six years. They have a four-year-old son, Justin, and share a home
in York. One Saturday, Nathan, who had been out of work for three months, spent
all day drinking at his favorite bar, something he had begun to do frequently. When
he came home that evening, he and Sarah got into an argument over his drinking
and their dire financial situation. Their screaming match soon escalated and Nathan
pushed Sarah so hard that she tripped over the arm of their couch. When she had
righted herself, she was immediately knocked down again by the force of Nathan's
fist hitting her in the mouth. Nathan stormed off to the kitchen, and Sarah, who
was frightened, her mouth still throbbing from the blow, reached for the phone and
dialed the police.
The dispatcher answered and as soon as Sarah began to relay her name and
address, the line went dead. Upon returning to the living room, Sarah saw that
Nathan had ripped the phone cord out of the wall and was threatening to hit her
with the base. He held a kitchen knife in his other hand. When the police arrived
at their house ten minutes later, having traced the phone call, they were greeted by
a smiling, nonchalant Nathan. Sarah could be seen from the doorway sitting on the
couch, her face swollen, comforting her son, Justin.
If this scene had played out prior to July 2002, it may have progressed in the
following manner: Because Maine police departments observe mandatory arrest
policies, the officers would likely have entered the home and spoken with both
Nathan and Sarah in order to determine who was the aggressor in the fight.2 Given
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 120-21 (1921).
2. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
SPONSE 126-43 (3d ed. 2003) for a discussion of mandatory arrest policies throughout the United
States. According to Buzawa and Buzawa, mandatory arrest policies have arisen out of the
increased "preference toward arrest... coupled with a growing desire to limit police discretion
in the decision of whether to make an arrest." Id. at 126. The desire to mitigate police discre-
tion in domestic violence cases stems, in part, from problems relating to "the inherent ambigu-
ity of the police-citizen encounter in the context of domestic violence." Id. Proponents of
mandatory arrest policies argue that "[allthough theoretically an independent decision for each
intervention, police actions in normal domestic calls will almost inevitably be colored and
bounded by the officer's 'common knowledge' of the futility of police intervention." 1d.
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Sarah's demeanor and injuries, Nathan would likely have been taken into custody.
If the arresting officers required more time to process the scene and speak to Sarah
about what had transpired in order to better inform their reports, it is possible that
Nathan would have been transported to the county jail by an officer who was not
directly involved in the arrest and who had not spoken with the parties about the
assault.
Upon Nathan's arrival at the jail, a bail hearing would have been scheduled as
soon as practicable. Because the arrest would have been made when no judges
would have been available for a hearing, Nathan would have likely appeared be-
fore a bail commissioner 3 or spoken with one over the phone. After speaking with
Nathan, the bail commissioner would then have set the conditions of his bail as
well as determined whether to release Nathan on personal recognizance or upon
execution of an appearance bond.4 Were the arresting officer not present, the bail
commissioner might have proceeded without the benefit of the officer's observa-
tions. Depending on how soon the bail hearing were to occur after Nathan's ar-
rest, 5 the bail commissioner might have made the bail determination without hav-
ing first consulted the police report.
In addition, because of a lack of protocol or information storage capabilities
within the State prior to July 2002, the bail commissioner would likely have been
unable to review Nathan's criminal record or protection from abuse history to de-
termine the existence of any outstanding warrants or protection orders against him.
It would not have been unusual for Nathan to be released within several hours of
his arrest without being required to appear in court for two months or more.
If Sarah simultaneously, or shortly thereafter, had filed a petition for a civil
protection from abuse order,6 a judge in granting a temporary protection from abuse
order would also have been unable to access files relating to the parties. The
judge, therefore, may have been unaware of the conditions of Nathan's release and
may have issued conditions that confuse or conflict with his bail conditions.7 The
3. Under ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1023(2) (West 2003), bail commissioners are ap-
pointed by the Chief Judge of the District Court. They have the authority to
set preconviction bail for a defendant in a criminal proceeding ... provided that a bail
commissioner may not set preconviction bail for a defendant: a. Who is charged with
murder; b. If the attorney for the State requests a Harnish bail proceeding for a defen-
dant charged with any other formerly capital offense; or c. As otherwise provided.
Id. at § 1023(1).
4. Id. at § 1026.
5. Initial appearance before a judicial officer for a bail determination typically needs to take
place within forty-eight hours of arrest. ME. R. CRIM. P. 5.
6. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 4001-12 (West 2003) (containing the language of
Maine's protection from abuse statute).
7. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1026(3) (West 2003), release on conditions, provides:
Conditions that will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant and ensure the
integrity of the judicial process must be imposed as provided in this subsection. A. If,
after consideration of the factors listed in subsection 4, the judicial officer determines
that the release described in subsection 2 will not reasonably ensure the appearance of
the defendant as required or will not otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the
judicial process, the judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the defendant
subject to the least restrictive further condition or combination of conditions that the
judicial officer determines will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as
required and will otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process.
These conditions may include that the defendant: (1) Remain in the custody of a
2004]
designated person or organization agreeing to supervise the defendant, including a
public official, public agency or publicly funded organization, if the designated per-
son or organization is able to reasonably ensure both the appearance of the defendant
as required and the integrity of the judicial process.... (2) Maintain employment or,
if unemployed, actively seek employment; (3) Maintain or commence an educational
program; (4) Abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode
or travel; (5) Avoid all contact with a victim of the alleged crime, a potential witness
regarding the alleged crime or with any other family or household members of the
victim or the defendant or to contact those individuals only at certain times or under
certain conditions; (6) Report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement
agency or other governmental agency; (7) Comply with a specified curfew; (8) Re-
frain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon; (9) Refrain from use or
excessive use of alcohol and from any use of drugs; (10) Undergo, as an outpatient,
available medical or psychiatric treatment, or enter and remain, as a voluntary pa-
tient, in a specified institution when required for that person; (11) Execute an agree-
ment to forfeit, upon failing to appear as required, such designated property, includ-
ing money, as is reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of the defendant as
required and to ensure the integrity of the judicial process and post with an appropri-
ate court such evidence of ownership of the property or such percentage of the money
as the judicial officer specifies; (12) Execute a bail bond with sureties in such amount
as is reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of the defendant as required and
to ensure the integrity of the judicial process; (13) Return to custody for specified
hours following release for employment, schooling or other limited purposes; (14)
Report on a regular basis to the defendant's attorney; (15) Notify the court of any
changes of address or employment; (16) Provide to the court the name, address and
telephone number of a designated person or organization that will know the defendant's
whereabouts at all times; (17) Inform any law enforcement officer of the defendant's
condition of release if the defendant is subsequently arrested or summoned for new
criminal conduct; and (18) Satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to
ensure the appearance of the defendant as required and to otherwise reasonably en-
sure the integrity of the judicial process.
Section 1026(4) outlines the factors that are to be considered in the release decision. That
section states:
In setting bail, the judicial officer shall, on the basis of an interview with the defen-
dant, information provided by the defendant's attorney and information provided by
the attorney for the State or an informed law enforcement officer if the attorney for
the State is not available and other reliable information that can be obtained, take into
account the available information concerning the following: A. The nature and cir-
cumstances of the crime charged; B. The nature of the evidence against the defen-
dant; and C. The history and characteristics of the defendant, including, but not lim-
ited to: (1) The defendant's character and physical and mental condition; (2) The
defendant's family ties in the State; (3) The defendant's employment history in the
State; (4) The defendant's financial resources; (5) The defendant's length of residence
in the community and the defendant's community ties; (6) The defendant's past con-
duct, including any history relating to drug or alcohol abuse; (7) The defendant's
criminal history, if any; (8) The defendant's record concerning appearances at court
proceedings; (9) Whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant
was on probation, parole or other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal or comple-
tion of a sentence for an offense in this jurisdiction or another; (10) Any evidence that
the defendant has obstructed or attempted to obstruct justice by threatening, injuring
or intimidating a victim or prospective witness, juror, attorney for the State, judge,
justice or other officer of the court; and (11) Whether the defendant has previously
violated conditions of release, probation or other orders, including, but not limited
to, violating protection from abuse orders pursuant to Title 19, section 769 or Title
19-A, section 4011.
Id. at § 1026(4) (emphasis added).
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conflicting orders may have provided enough ambiguity that Nathan would have
opted not to follow the provisions of the temporary protection order. In addition, if
Sarah had neglected to fully elaborate on the circumstances leading to her request
for a protection order, or if the judge reviewing the petition was overloaded with a
great number of other cases, her lack of access to information regarding Nathan's
criminal history may have caused her to order conditions that are largely ineffec-
tual. 8
To further complicate matters, it is likely that different judges would have
presided over Nathan's criminal and civil matters. Appearing before different
judges, who may have had differing levels of commitment or time to dedicate to
domestic violence and who were unaware of other pending cases involving the
parties, would have increased the likelihood that the outcomes in each of Nathan's
cases would be at variance with one another. In addition, due to overcrowded
dockets and overworked probation officers, Nathan's compliance with any
postconviction probation conditions or conditions of the protection order may have
gone unchecked.
The scenario outlined above is demonstrative of some of the problems that
can arise out of traditional courts' handling of domestic violence cases. In Maine,
prior to July 2002, a widespread lack of information sharing or cooperation among
law enforcement and courts often led to disjointed and ineffectual judicial inter-
vention in cases involving domestic violence. 9
Suppose, however, that Nathan and Sarah's situation played out this way in-
stead: After Nathan's arrest, the bail hearing was postponed until the bail commis-
sioner had an opportunity to speak with the arresting officer or review the police
report. The officer informed the bail commissioner that Nathan had wielded a
knife during his attack on Sarah. State record systems, having been updated and
made widely accessible, were accessed and the bail commissioner was made aware
that Nathan had been previously convicted of domestic assault. His probation
conditions prohibited him from using drugs or alcohol. The bail commissioner,
taking into account the prior conviction, violation of probation conditions, and the
use of a weapon, set Nathan's bail at an appropriate amount. Further, if released,
Nathan's first court appearance would have been scheduled to take place two weeks
from the time of his arrest.
Similarly, in reviewing Sarah's petition for a protection from abuse order, the
judge was made aware of the parties' history. As a result, the conditions of the
temporary order were consistent with those of Nathan's bail conditions. The dis-
trict attorney's office, also made aware of the parties' history, took Nathan's prior
conviction and violation of his conditions into account when making the charging
decision. In addition, rather than having each matter heard by a different judge,
both the final protection from abuse hearing and Nathan's court appearance for the
criminal assault charge were heard by the same judge. If convicted and placed on
probation, the court, through regular judicial reviews, would have monitored
Nathan's compliance with his probation conditions.
8. See infra text accompanying note 95 for the various conditions a judge may set as part of
a protection from abuse order under ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007 (West 1998).
9. See Jon Levy, STOP Violence Against Women Grant Application (Sept. 13, 2001) [herein-
after STOP Grant] (on file with Maine Law Review).
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The second scenario, outlined above, represents the coordinated response en-
visioned by the recently adopted Specialized Domestic Violence Pilot Project (Pi-
lot Project), implemented in York and Portland in July and August 2002. The Pilot
Project is the result of the collaborative efforts of the District Court system, law
enforcement, prosecutors, members of the defense bar, and various community
agencies offering services to victims and perpetrators. District court judges are
largely responsible for overseeing the changes in court procedures and implement-
ing the new protocols in domestic violence cases. The Pilot Project, and the changes
it is making to the role that courts play in domestic violence cases, represents a
significant departure from the procedures followed by traditional court programs.
As a result of newly coordinated efforts and increased communication and train-
ing, the Pilot Project has the potential to alter the disposition of domestic violence
cases in the State of Maine.
Given the departure from traditional court models that the Pilot Project repre-
sents, and the role that the judicial branch has played in effectuating these new
changes, the following questions begin to surface: Is the Pilot Project, and other
similar specialized domestic violence court programs around the country, in some
way representative of unorthodox judicial action? Could the newly-active role
undertaken by the judicial branch to reorganize court structures be conceived of as
a form of "activism" unlike that seen in conventional court settings? Finally, if
such court programs are in fact examples of judicial activism, are they consequently
objectionable or their outcomes subject to accusations of partiality in the same
way that are other instances of so called "judicial activism"?
This Comment will endeavor to explore some of these questions as they relate
to the development and operation of creative judicial programs, particularly within
the State of Maine. Specifically, it will focus on the role that Maine's new Pilot
Domestic Violence Project plays in adjudicating domestic violence cases and the
extent to which the project represents, at the very least a departure from more
traditional court programs and is, perhaps, also an example of "judicial activism."
In order to unpack these issues, this Comment will progress as follows: Sec-
tion II will undertake a brief historical discussion of domestic violence adjudica-
tion within traditional court systems operating, ostensibly, within the confines of
conventional, "objective" judicial frameworks. This background will provide a
point of departure for an analysis of the shortcomings of traditional courts' treat-
ment of domestic violence and the subsequent development of alternative ap-
proaches to adjudicating these difficult cases. Section III will then explore the
development of specialized domestic violence courts around the country and dis-
cuss the philosophies and objectives embodied by them. Section IV will discuss
an ideological framework, proffered by the Chief Judge of New York, Judith Kaye,
that domestic violence courts, rather than being representative of "judicial activ-
ism," are, instead, examples of "judicial problem-solving," which, according to
her, are entirely consistent with the usual function of American courts. t 0 Through
an analysis of this idea of "judicial problem solving," as contrasted with more
controversial notions of "judicial activism," this Comment will discuss whether
10. Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The Case
for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Kaye &
Knipps].
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the two concepts are entirely divergent or are, instead, reconcilable with one an-
other. This discussion will explore instances of arguably proper judicial activism
and propose that, in some circumstances, court policies and programmatic changes
resulting in changed applications of the substantive law represent instances where
courts are appropriately and necessarily empowered to practice judicial activism.
Section V will then delve into the recent development of a specialized domes-
tic violence court program in Maine and discuss new approaches to domestic vio-
lence adjudication in the State. Through a discussion of the streamlining and reor-
ganization of court resources and procedures, this Comment will explore whether
Maine's court represents an example of Kaye's "problem solving" efforts or whether
it, instead, represents a more significant transformation capable of achieving more
far-reaching, substantive change. Finally, in Section VI, this Comment will draw
several conclusions based on the foregoing discussion and argue that, in addition
to affecting procedural changes and solving structural problems within the court
system itself, the pilot project in Maine (and similar court programs around the
country) also has the potential to change the way the substantive laws are applied
in domestic violence cases.
II. TRADITIONAL COURT MODELS AND A HISTORY OF DOMESrTC VIOLENCE
ADJUDICATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Domestic violence, as that term is widely understood and as it will be used in
this Comment, has been broadly defined as any violence that "involves individuals
in intimate relationships who use their power to physically, emotionally, sexually,
or verbally abuse their partners."11 So defined, domestic violence has proven to
be a widespread problem throughout the United States both contemporarily and
historically. 12 The prevalence of domestic violence and the impacts it has on so-
cial service agencies, the healthcare field, and the legal system indicate the need
for concerted efforts to address the ongoing problem and, ultimately, to stop the
11. Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on
an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1285, 1288 (2000) (citing The Family Violence
Prevention Fund, It's Your Business: Community Action Kit); but see U.S. Department of Jus-
lice, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings From the Na-
tional Violence Against Women Survey, 5 (2000) (available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/
nij/181867.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2003) [hereinafter NVAW Survey] (explaining "[tihere is
currently little consensus among researchers on exactly how to define the term 'intimate partner
violence"' for the purposes of quantitative research methodology. According to the NVAW
Survey's authors, data collected through studies that employ differing definitions of domestic
violence are consequently difficult to compare. Some definitions are limited to "acts carried out
with the intention of, or perceived intention of, causing physical pain or injury to another per-
son." Others, however, perceive a need to account for "the myriad behaviors that persons may
use to control, intimidate, and otherwise dominate another person in the context of an intimate
relationship"). NVAW Survey, at 5.
12. See, e.g., NVAW Survey, supra note 11, at iii ("Intimate partner violence is pervasive in
U.S. society."); BuZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 2, at 57-64 (outlining various reasons why
"[d]omestic violence has long been both a feature and a concern of society").
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violence. 13 Effective intervention in domestic violence cases has, however, proven
particularly difficult for the legal system.
14
Despite the crucial role that the legal system must necessarily play in sanc-
tioning the criminal behavior of abusers and protecting the rights and safety of
victims, several factors have hindered the ability of courts to mitigate the impacts
of domestic violence on victims and society. 15 Some examples of the factors im-
peding courts' progress include crowded dockets and a consequent lack of time
and resources available to judges when dealing with individual cases. 16 A perva-
sive judicial culture that has historically regarded, and to some degree continues to
regard, domestic violence cases as less important than other, less complex matters,
has also served to undermine the legal system's ability to meaningfully redress the
problem. 17
Through a discussion of these and other issues, this section will explore the
magnitude and prevalence of domestic violence and its sometimes uneasy inter-
face with the judicial system. In doing so, this discussion will track the history of
domestic violence jurisprudence in American courts and illustrate the ongoing chal-
lenges these cases pose.
A. Tracking the History of Domestic Violence Adjudication in the United States
Domestic violence cases have historically occupied an uneasy place in Ameri-
can jurisprudence. Dating back to English common law, upon which the American
legal system is based, courts have a long tradition of regarding domestic violence
13. See NVAW Survey, supra note 11, at 57. The Survey reports the prevalence of domestic
violence, the demographic makeup of victims, and the impact of domestic violence on the health
care field and U.S. justice system. According to the NVAW Survey, "[b]ecause many female
and male victims of intimate partner rape and physical assault receive multiple forms of care for
the same injury victimization, medical personnel in the United States treat millions of intimate
partner injury victims annually." Id. Additionally, the authors of the Survey argue that "crimi-
nal justice practitioners should receive comprehensive training about the safety needs of vic-
tims" in order to improve the rate at which domestic abuse is reported and the efficacy of the
criminal justice response. Id.
14. See, e.g., JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES 170 (1999) (discussing the widely held belief that civil restraining orders in domestic
violence cases are ineffectual). See also Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic
Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 3 (1999) ("Despite over two decades of reform, fundamental failures persist
in the justice system's response to domestic violence."); and Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-
Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The Truly National and The Truly Local," 42
B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1111 (2001) ("The historic belief that domestic violence matters have no
legitimate place in the courts is centrally implicated in the failure of the legal system to address
them.").
15. For a discussion of the role that courts play in effectuating societal change, see Judith S.
Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, Speech at the American Bar Association Sympo-
sium, Public Perception and Understanding of the Justice System (Feb. 25-26, 1999), in 62 ALB.
L. REV. 1491 (1999); Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narra-
tive in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1243, 1247-53 (1993); Richard C.
Wesley, Hugh Jones and Modern Courts: The Pursuit of Justice Then and Now, 65 ALB. L. REV.
1123, 1132-35 (2002).
16. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1293-94; Weissman, supra note 14, at 1113-14.
17. See Weissman, supra note 14, at 1111 ("[D]eeper structural problems ... provide the
ingredients for the subordinated treatment of gender-based violence claims. The legacy of past
indifference to domestic violence claims, whereby wife beating found countenance in doctrinal
law, continues to insinuate itself in modem jurisprudence.").
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as a private family matter--one that implicates issues and conflicts beyond the
scope of proper judicial intervention. 18 This complacency by courts is both the
result and the cause of judicial customs that have historically accepted, at least
implicitly, wife-beating as a husband's right. 19
The North Carolina Supreme Court expressed the view held by most early
American courts rather tellingly in 1864. State v. Black,20 involved the prosecu-
tion of a husband for assaulting his wife when he "seized her by her hair,' 2 1 and
threw her to the floor. The North Carolina court stated the general rule regarding a
husband's "right" to "discipline" his wife as follows: "A husband is responsible
for the acts of his wife, and he is required to govern his household, and for that
purpose the law permits him to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is
necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself."'22 Indeed,
according to the criminal law as it existed in 1864, and as perceived by the court in
Black, "[a] husband cannot be convicted of a battery on his wife unless he inflicts
permanent injury, or uses such excessive violence or cruelty as indicates malignity
or vindictiveness.
' 23
The belief held by early American courts that husbands acted within their
rights when they beat and abused their wives in response to "misbehavior" stemmed
from a larger body of law and social custom that denied women a viable legal
identity of their own. 24 Some of the legal doctrines dating back to English com-
mon law and the inception of the American legal system, which effectively "con-
signed women to the domestic sphere in which the law then refused to intervene,"
'25
were the old laws of coverture. 26 That doctrine, "premised on the theory of mari-
tal unity," 27 provided that "a woman who enters marriage surrenders her legal
identity to her husband and enters into the state of coverture, during which 'the
husband and wife are one person in law.' 28
Early common law, based on this model of coverture, "prohibited married
women from making contracts, keeping their wages, entering professions, estab-
lishing a separate domicile, and buying, selling or owning property." 29 The prac-
tical effect of these laws was that women were largely prevented "from participat-
ing as individuals in the economic world outside the home."'30 As stated previ-
ously, part of the reason for courts' traditional refusal or reluctance to sanction
domestic violence stemmed from a belief that the law ought not "invade the do-
mestic forum or go behind the curtain '3 1 of home and family. Some scholars have
argued that this reluctance or refusal by courts to delve into issues implicating
18. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1288-89.
19. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 22 (2000).
20. 1864WL 1041 (N.C.).
21. Id. at *1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 22.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 21. See also Epstein, supra note 14, at 9-11.
27. Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 21.
28. Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430).
29. Id. at 22.
30. Id. (footnote omitted).
31. State v. Black, 1864 WL 1041, at *1 (N.C.).
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family dynamics is the result of a more general and influential "market-family
dichotomy" pervading social attitudes and practices in the nineteenth century.
32
According to this theory, courts were reluctant to delve into issues that they deemed
"private" and consequently refused to sanction a husband's abuse of his wife be-
cause women were largely consigned to the family and the home and were pre-
cluded from participating in the marketplace. 33 Indeed, the statements made by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Black are illustrative. According to Chief
Justice Pearson, the law
prefers to leave the parties to themselves, as the best mode of inducing them
to make the matter up and live together as man and wife should. Certainly the
exposure of a scene like that set out in this case can do no good. In respect to the
parties, a public exhibition in the Court House of such quarrels and fights be-
tween man and wife, widens the breach, makes a reconciliation almost impos-
sible, and encourages insubordination.
34
The result of this judicial attitude, which regarded family matters and, more
specifically, domestic violence, as largely undeserving of judicial time and atten-
tion was a widespread denial of "criminal and tort remedies for violence commit-
ted within" intimate family relationships. 35 Indeed, because of similar attitudes
held by other state and federal courts around the country, domestic violence was
not widely criminalized until the late nineteenth century.36 Significantly, it was
not until 1871 that a state court, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Fulgham v.
State,37 determined for the first time "that a husband did not have the right to beat
his wife, and that a 'wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.'
3 8
In the years following the Alabama court's decision in Fulgham, several states
began adopting "laws against domestic violence that made wife-beating a punish-
32. See Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 18-34. See also BuzAwA & BuZAwA, supra note 2, at 57-
68 (discussing the role religion and social customs played in forming and reinforcing social
attitudes regarding domestic abuse).
33. Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 22-32. The "market-family dichotomy," as discussed by
feminist and legal scholars, refers to the "demarcation between market and family," both within
the legal system as well as in the larger social order, that accompanied "industrialization and the
resulting movement of work away from the home." Id. at 19-20. The ideology that resulted
tended to view men as "naturally suited to the public world of labor and commerce, while women"
were seen as "destined for the private sphere of home and hearth." Id. at 20. In turn, according
to some, "the marketplace was viewed as public and therefore an appropriate subject for legal
intervention, [while] the domestic sphere was idealized as a private realm in which affection,
not law, would rule." Id. at 20-21. The result, "therefore, [was that] the law adopted a policy of
refusing to intrude in the family." Id. at 21.
34. State v. Black, 1864 WL 1041, at *1-2. The court went on to observe the perceived
consequences that court intervention in "private" matters has on the public at large. The court
said that "in respect to the public," court involvement in private matters "has a pernicious ten-
dency," so much so that "such matters are excluded from the Courts, unless there is a permanent
injury or excessive violence or cruelty indicating malignity and vindictiveness." Id. at *2. State
v. Rhodes, also decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, further illustrates the manner
in which early American courts tended to undervalue issues raised by domestic violence crimes.
61 N.C. 453 (1868). See also Epstein, supra note 14, at 10-11.
35. Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 23.
36. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1289.
37. 46Ala. 143 (1871).
38. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1289. (quoting Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. at 147).
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able offense."' 39 Important shifts, at least in the official positions of legislatures
and state courts, occurred toward the end of the nineteenth century when "three
states, Maryland, Delaware, and Oregon, adopted laws against wife-beating."
4 0
At the same time, "nine other states were also considering stronger laws against
wife-beating, and chastisement was no longer considered a defense to assault on
one's wife in most states."
4 1
Despite explicit statutory directives proscribing domestic abuse, individual
opinions held by judges and/or prosecutors regarding the appropriate role of the
law in "private" family matters frustrated legislative efforts to ameliorate the rights
of abused women under the law.4 2 The demarcation between the stated rule of law
and the application of those laws is, according to feminist legal scholars, indica-
tive of the persistent and powerful influence of the "market-family dichotomy" on
judicial attitudes.
4 3
The influence of distinctions made between ostensibly "public" and "private"
issues did, however, eventually begin to break down in the 1970s and 1980s with
the introduction of new, more sophisticated, legislative schemes addressing do-
mestic violence.4 4 Largely as a result of the feminist movement in the 1970s,
"efforts to increase the strength of the criminal justice response to domestic vio-
lence" 4 5 led to "substantial improvements in statutory law" 4 6 and a shift in the
way the legal system dealt with domestic violence cases. In stark contrast to the
law as stated in 1864 by the court in Black, every state has now "enacted a civil
protection order statute, and the vast majority of these authorize the essential relief
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1289 n.34 (citing BuzAwA & BuzAwA, supra note 2, at 31-32).
41. Id. Despite these additions to the legal terrain and the seeming shift in the regard that
courts and legislatures had for domestic violence cases, however, the practical application of the
new laws proved to be less than ideal. For many years, indeed for decades, after states began to
create formal legal remedies for victims of domestic violence, perpetrators of abuse tended to be
sanctioned only in the most extreme circumstances. Id. at 1289. Studies of state courts' compli-
ance with enacted domestic violence legislation reveal that despite explicit statutory directives,
"the sentencing of convicted domestic violence offenders," continued to be "quite lenient, with
few offenders sentenced to serve any jail time." BuZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 2, at 214 (citing
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS (New York
Free Press 1992)). In Ohio, for example, one study revealed that while most domestic violence
cases were dismissed (81 percent), "even in the rare circumstance that a domestic violence de-
fendant was convicted and received a prison sentence, sentence terms were shorter than they
were for other types of offenders." Id. at 215 (citing Daisy Quarm & Martin D. Schwartz, Legal
Reform and the Criminal Court: The Case of Domestic Violence, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 199 (1983)
and Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim Participation in Sentencing on Sen-
tencing Outcomes, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 451 (1990)).
42. Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 20-24 (2000). See also Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial
Anomaly: Between "The Truly National and The Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REv. 1081, 1110
(2001) (suggesting that there continues to be a disconnect between legislative enactments and
application of those laws by state courts: "Although progress has been made through state
legislative enactments, there is a critical disjuncture between formal law on the one hand, and
the implementation of statutes by the courts in matters involving domestic violence on the other").
43. Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 22-23.
44. Epstein, supra note 14, at 11.
45. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1290.
46. Epstein, supra note 14, at 11.
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necessary for battered women to leave an abusive relationship." 47 Further, a great
many states have "adopted criminal contempt laws to help enforce protection or-
ders," with most states making the violation of "a protection order a statutory
crime."
48
Such legislative efforts, which have endeavored to create viable legal rem-
edies for domestic violence victims, coincided with other similarly important ef-
forts being made at about the same time by various community agencies around
47. Id. Maine's protection from abuse statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4001 (West
1998 & Supp. 2003), identifies the purposes of the law as follows:
The court shall liberally construe and apply this chapter to promote the following
underlying purposes: (1) Recognition. To recognize domestic abuse as a serious
crime against the individual and society, producing an unhealthy and dangerous fam-
ily environment, resulting in a pattern of escalating abuse, including violence, that
frequently culminates in intrafamily homicide and creating an atmosphere that is not
conducive to healthy childhood development; (2) Protection. To allow family and
household members who are victims of domestic abuse to obtain expeditious and
effective protection against further abuse so that the lives of the nonabusing family or
household members are as secure and uninterrupted as possible; (3) Enforcement. To
provide protection by promptly entering and diligently enforcing court orders that
prohibit abuse and, when necessary, by reducing the abuser's access to the victim and
addressing related issues of parental rights and responsibilities and economic support
so that victims are not trapped in abusive situations by fear of retaliation, loss of a
child or financial dependence; (4) Prevention. To expand the power of the justice
system to respond effectively to situations of domestic abuse, to clarify the responsi-
bilities and support the efforts of law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judicial
officers to provide immediate, effective assistance and protection for victims of abuse
and to recognize the crucial role of law enforcement officers in preventing further
incidents of abuse and in assisting the victims of abuse; (5) Data collection. To pro-
vide for the collection of data concerning domestic abuse in an effort to develop a
comprehensive analysis of the incidence and causes of that abuse; and (6) Mutual
order. To declare that a mutual order of protection or restraint undermines the pur-
poses of this chapter.
48. Epstein, supra note 14, at 12. In Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4011 (West 1998
& Supp. 2003), governs violation of a protection order as follows:
1. Crime committed. Except as provided in subsections 2 and 4, violation of the
following is a Class D crime when the defendant has actual prior notice by means
other than service in hand, of the order or agreement: (A) A temporary, emergency,
interim or final protective order, an order of the tribal court of the Passamaquoddy
Tribe or the Penobscot Nation or a similar order issued by a court of the United States
or of another state, territory, commonwealth or tribe; or (B)A court-approved consent
agreement.
2. Exception. When the only provision that is violated concerns relief authorized
under section 4007, subsection 1, paragraphs H to M, the violation must be treated as
contempt and punished in accordance with law.
3. Warrantless arrest. Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, an
arrest for criminal violation of an order or consent agreement may be without warrant
upon probable cause whether or not the violation is committed in the presence of the
law enforcement officer. The law enforcement officer may verify, if necessary, the
existence of a protective order by telephone or radio communication with a law en-
forcement agency with knowledge of the order.
4. Reckless conduct; assault. A defendant who violates a protective order issued
pursuant to section 4007 through conduct that is reckless and that creates a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury to the plaintiff named in the protective order or
who assaults the plaintiff named in the protective order commits a Class C crime.
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the country, many of which were state funded. While state legislatures began passing
statutes criminalizing domestic violence in the 1970s and 1980s, "[n]umerous gov-
ernment programs directed at what was once considered a 'private matter' began
to appear, including state-funded shelters, batterer intervention programs, 49 spe-
cialized prosecution teams, and published studies containing data on domestic vio-
lence."'50 These types of programs, when coupled with the work being done by
state governments, resulted in an evolution of sorts, where the "United States [be-
gan moving] from an era when no term for intimate abuse existed in the national
lexicon to one of substantial public awareness of the problem, a growing percep-
tion that it is unacceptable, and increasing political will to intervene. '
51
Despite these important changes in the statutory law and in social customs
and attitudes regarding domestic violence, however, the legal system and the cul-
ture of traditional courts have continued to lag behind.52 In some areas, the tradi-
tional tendency by the judicial system to relegate domestic violence cases to a
"private" sphere and treat them with less judicial regard than other, seemingly
more "public" cases, has persisted.5 3 This tendency by traditional courts to under-
value domestic violence cases has resulted in a failure by the legal system to ad-
equately redress the crime of domestic abuse54 and is most clearly demonstrated
by its continued "inability to stem the tide of domestic violence itself."'55 The
continued failure of the judicial system to generate marked changes in domestic
violence rates and to effectuate the objectives embodied in criminal and civil do-
49. See Tsai, supra note 11, at 1318-24 for a general discussion of the benefits and challenges
associated with batterer intervention programs and the association of these programs with spe-
cialized domestic violence courts. In Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4014 governs the
role of batterer intervention programs (BIPs) in court mandated treatment of abusers. Accord-
ing to the Maine Department of Corrections (which, under section 4014, oversees the adoption
of BIP standards), BIPs for men are defined as follows:
The purposes of programs for batterers, as part of a coordinated community response
to domestic abuse, are to: (a) promote the safety of victims and their children from
the crimes of domestic abuse in an effort to support [victims]; and (b) within an edu-
cational framework, to hold batterers accountable both in the group and in conjunc-
tion with the criminal justice system.
03-201 Department of Corrections Ch. 15, Certification and Monitoring of Batterer Interven-
tion Programs, available at ftp://ftp.state.me.us/pub/sos/cec/rcn/apa/03/201/20lcO15.doc (on
file with Maine Law Review).
50. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1290.
51. Epstein, supra note 14, at 11.
52. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1291-94.
53. See id. at 1294 (discussing a number of more contemporary policies and judicial attitudes
which "reinforce traditional approaches to domestic violence by implying a legal condonation
of family violence"). See also Weissman, supra note 14, at 1110-39. "Although progress has
been made through state legislative enactments, there is a critical disjuncture between formal
law on the one hand, and the implementation of the statutes by the courts in matters involving
domestic violence on the other." Id. at 1110.
54. See Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 5-6.
55. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1291-92.
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mestic violence statutes has placed increasing pressure on the judicial system to
adjust and improve its approach.
56
B. Current Domestic Violence Rates in the United States
The consequences of judicial attitudes that undervalue domestic violence cases
and fall short of achieving lasting, effective solutions for litigants and society at
large cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the magnitude of the
problem. Domestic violence rates in the United States are, at least to the uniniti-
ated, shocking. Some general estimates place the incidence of domestic abuse
suffered by women at "anywhere between one million and four million women a
year."'57 Indeed, an examination of the statistical data concerning domestic vio-
lence rates around the country reveals that the vast number of cases are, them-
selves, problematic in terms of courts' ability to dedicate the resources and judicial
attention necessary to properly address these cases. In addition to the entrenched,
outdated attitudes of some judges which undermine the rights of victims, systemic
procedural shortcomings render courts ill-equipped to handle the vast number of
domestic violence cases appearing on their dockets.
58
Overloaded dockets, when coupled with inefficient court procedures for deal-
ing with domestic violence and judges who are reticent to change their approaches,
have resulted in ineffective judicial responses to domestic abuse in the United
States.59 Yet it is precisely because of the prevalence of domestic abuse in the
United States, that courts, as integral members of community response systems,
must operate effectively and consistently.
Over the past thirty years, numerous studies have attempted to measure the
prevalence of domestic violence with an eye toward identifying ways to end the
violence. 60 Much of the data arising from these studies, while all indicative of a
widespread problem, "vary widely from study to study."6 1 As mentioned above,
surveys conducted in 1995 and 1996, for example, "estimated that anywhere be-
56. See Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at
How Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851, 854 (1997). Judge Kaye argues:
[W]e have to take a good, hard look at what sort of cases are in the state courts today.
Changing social realities have brought courts not only more cases but also more so-
cial issues that are frustrating the other branches of government; cases involving drug
addiction, homelessness, juvenile crime, and family violence. Each case has its legal
issues, but it may also involve social issues that challenge the effectiveness of our
traditional adjudicative models.
Id. See also Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of Narrative in Domes-
tic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1243, 1268 (1993); Paul Michael Hassett, Expand-
ing the Role of Courts, 73 N.Y. ST. B.J. 5, 5-6 (2001).
57. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1292 (citing statistics compiled by The Commission on Domestic
Violence, Statistics, at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html).
58. See id. at 1293-94.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., RONET BACHMAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT (1994); Claire M.
Renzetti, Violence and Abuse Among Same-Sex Couples, in VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATE PART-
NERS: PATTrERNS, CAUSES, AND EFFECTS 70 (A.P. Cardarelli ed., 1997); Murray A. Straus & Richard
J, Gelles, Societal Change and Change in Family Violence From 1975 to 1985 as Revealed by
Two National Surveys, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 465 (1986).
61. NVAW Survey, supra note 11, at 1.
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tween one million and four million women a year experience violence at the hands
of their partners. ' 62 Such significant gaps in the estimated prevalence of domestic
violence are problematic when trying to gauge the severity of the problem and the
impact that domestic violence has on communities.
63
One recent study, however, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and
the Centers for Disease Control, attempted to alleviate the discrepancies with a
national survey conducted through "telephone interviews with a representative
sample of 8,000 U.S. women and 8,000 U.S. men queried about their experiences
as victims of various forms of violence, including... stalking by intimate part-
ners."64 That study, entitled the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAW
survey), led researchers to estimate that "approximately 4.8 million intimate part-
ner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against U.S. women annually."
65
In addition to helping track the prevalence of domestic violence around the
country, the NVAW survey also demonstrates the impact that domestic violence
has on victims and communities. Because the injuries sustained by many victims
of domestic violence are severe and may require ongoing medical treatment, such
as multiple physical therapy sessions or inpatient treatment in hospitals, the im-
pact of domestic violence on health care providers is substantial. 66 According to
the NVAW survey, "the annual number of medical treatments provided to intimate
partner rape and physical assault victims exceeds the annual number of intimate
partner victimizations that resulted in treatment."'67 The number of domestic vio-
lence victims who are injured annually and who require medical attention illus-
trates the fact that "intimate partner violence is ... a serious public health con-
cern."
68
The impact of domestic violence on other community members is similarly
great. According to a report published by the Bureau of National Affairs, "domes-
tic abuse is costing businesses between 3 and 5 billion dollars annually in lost
productivity in the forms of higher health care costs, lost wages, sick leave, absen-
teeism and higher turnover rates."'69 In addition, social service providers are fre-
quently overwhelmed by the vast numbers of victims seeking assistance and are
regularly faced with insufficient resources. 70 For example, the number of shelters
62. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1292 (citing statistics compiled by The Commission on Domestic
Violence, Statistics, at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html).
63. See NVAW Survey, supra note 11, at iv.
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at iii. The study also led researchers to estimate that "approximately 2.9 million inti-
Qmate partner physical assaults are committed against [U.S.] men annually." Id. Although the
number of estimated domestic assaults perpetrated against men are certainly significant and of
concern to those advocating for an end to domestic violence, this Comment focuses primarily on
abuse rates relating to women. The decision to focus on female victims of intimate partner
violence is in no way meant to discount the experiences of men. Rather, in the interests of
clarity and conciseness, and recognizing that the vast majority of domestic abuse victims are, in
fact, women, the author has opted to defer to generalities.
66. See id. at 45.
67. Id.
68. Id. at iii.
69. CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 910 (2001).
70. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE




available to victims of domestic violence have historically been notoriously insuf-
ficient due to a lack of resources. 7 1 While the number and quality of services
available to victims of domestic violence have drastically improved over the last
twenty years, the demand for and impact on community resources remains high.
Domestic violence is not only a significant and troubling problem for social
service agencies and the healthcare field, however. It also, necessarily, has pro-
found implications for the criminal justice system. The sheer number of domestic
violence assaults is indicative of a "crime wave of tsunamic proportions."'72
According to the findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey,
26.7 percent of "women who were physically assaulted," 17.2 percent of "the women
raped by an intimate," and 51.9 percent of victims of intimate partner stalking had
reported their most recent victimization to police.73 These findings indicate that
approximately 1,188,365 victims of physical assault, 55,424 victims of intimate
rape, and 261,309 victims of stalking reported the abuse to police. 74 Of the women
who reported domestic violence to law enforcement, only a small number (ap-
proximately 29.4 percent combined) reported that the perpetrator had been crimi-
nally prosecuted.75 Although the percentages of domestic violence cases that were
criminally prosecuted is seemingly low, the number of cases is nevertheless quite
large and indicative of a substantial demand on the criminal justice system.
Cases being brought before courts for civil relief are also substantial in num-
ber. According to the NVWA survey, of the estimated 5,276,522 women who are
raped, physically assaulted, or stalked by an intimate annually, approximately
1,131,999 "obtain protective or restraining orders against their attackers." 76 Again,
the sheer number of domestic violence cases coming before state courts, although
not representative of all domestic assaults due to underreporting, indicate the sig-
nificant demand being placed on courts and the importance of there being effective
judicial responses.
Despite the critical role that courts and the legal system must necessarily play
in confronting domestic violence, there is statistical evidence to suggest that ef-
forts made by traditional court programs have largely been inadequate. Recent
research indicates that the remedies provided by traditional courts often prove to
be ineffective. One 1996 study found that sixty percent of protection orders issued
to protect victims from battering partners were violated.77 Another found that
"more than 17 [percent] of victims killed in domestic incidents had obtained or-
ders of protection."'78 These numbers make it difficult for the legal system to
71. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, one study revealed that "in the State of Minnesota, 70
percent of the women requesting shelter had to be turned away because of a lack of space."
SCHECHTER, supra note 70, reprinted in DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 69, at 42.
72. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 3.
73. NVAW Survey, supra note 11, at 49-50.
74. Id. at 53.
75. Id. at 52. According to the survey, "only 7.5 percent of the women who were raped by an
intimate, 7.3 percent of the women who were physically assaulted by an intimate, and 14.6
percent who were stalked by an intimate said their attacker was criminally prosecuted." Id.
However, "[t]hese figures increase to 31.1 percent, 24.7 percent, and 25.4 percent, respectively,
... when only victims whose stalking was reported to the police are considered." Id.
76. Id. at 54.
77. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1292.
78. Id.
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claim that its response to domestic violence and its efforts to stop the abuse have
been adequate. While it is perhaps unfair to place the onus for these tragic num-
bers on the legal system alone, it is also difficult to reconcile the continued preva-
lence of domestic violence with a justice system that is functioning effectively.
C. Contemporary Responses to Domestic Violence by Traditional Court Programs
In addition to the explanations for the legal system's inability to effectively
redress domestic violence crimes which relate to private/public distinctions and
pervasive ideological paradigms, there are a number of more practical, readily
identifiable problems relating to the way traditional courts operate that also shed
light on the legal system's struggle in this area.79 While judicial traditions that
inform the reluctance by courts to tackle issues surrounding domestic violence
stymie effective intervention, other largely procedural problems also impede ef-
fective judicial responses. Some issues relating to courts' role in domestic vio-
lence cases that have proven particularly problematic relate to court administra-
tion and the fragmentation that exists between various departments of traditional
court systems.
80
In their article, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The Case for a Prob-
lem Solving Approach,8 1 Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of New York State, and Su-
san K. Knipps, broadly identify some of the administrative problems facing the
New York State criminal justice system in the handling of domestic violence
crimes.82 Although their observations are concerned primarily with courts in New
York, they are more broadly applicable to courts throughout the United States.
According to Kaye and Knipps, the unique and complex issues implicated by do-
mestic violence cases and an alleged lack of training or sensitivity on the part of
court personnel are often at the center of the tension between domestic violence
and traditional court programs. 83 In many ways, "[diomestic violence cases are
more volatile, more dangerous, [and] harder to prosecute."' 84 In criminal prosecu-
tions, the relationship between the victim and the batterer "makes domestic vio-
lence different from prototypical 'stranger' crimes. Unlike participants in a bar-
room brawl or street skirmish, perpetrators of domestic violence present a particu-
larly high risk for continuing.., violence."'85 Further, "[u]nlike victims of ran-
dom attacks, battered women often have compelling reasons-like fear, economic
dependence or affection-to feel ambivalent about cooperating with the legal pro-
cess."
86
According to Kaye and Knipps, "[t]he fragmented nature of the criminal jus-
tice system exacerbates" the risk that "traditional case processing methods will
79. I am not suggesting that these practical, administrative disconnects within the judicial
system are not inherently informed by, or the result of, systemic gender bias and the traditional
public/private dichotomy. Rather, I am suggesting that the concrete, tangible and everyday
workings of the courts, which flow from the traditional paradigms, are similarly flawed.
80. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 5.
81. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10.
82. Id. at 3-5.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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fail to sanction or deter" domestic violence. 87 Because "[tihe basic outlines of our
criminal justice system-including what we expect courts to do and how we ex-
pect them to do it-were formed long before domestic violence was recognized as
an act deserving criminal sanction," it is not surprising that "a system built on the
model of offenses against strangers may falter when applied to crimes that occur in
the context of intimate human relationships." 88 They argue that inadequate "coor-
dination or communication between police, prosecutors, the defense bar, victim
advocates, probation, corrections and the courts," increases the likelihood that
domestic violence cases will "slip between the cracks." 89
Betsy Tsai, in The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Im-
provements on an Effective Innovation,90 enumerates a number of more specific
criticisms of the way traditional courts address domestic violence. 9 1 Tsai cites
four primary problems with the manner in which courts have traditionally pro-
cessed domestic violence cases, one of which relates to the way the civil side of
the legal system operates.92 As domestic violence surveys demonstrate, one major
problem facing courts when dealing with civil relief is "the general inadequacy of
protection orders to prevent further abuse.' 93 A protection order, obtained through
the civil process, is an injunctive order "impos[ing] restrictions on a person's fu-
ture behavior."'94 Requested by a victim of domestic violence, a protection order
may: require no contact between the parties, order an abuser to relinquish any
firearms, grant possession of a shared residence to the victim, and "address issues
such as... child custody, visitation, and support."
9 5
Protection orders represent a critical legal remedy available to women attempt-
ing to escape domestic violence and prevent future abuse. They may not, however,
always be "the most effective remedy for preventing future violence in all cases."
'96
Because protection orders are only as effective as the conditions they impose on a
batterer, and because a court's ability to assess the needs of individual victims is
dependent upon the depth of its understanding of the particular issues incident to
each case, cursory treatment of protection order petitions can lead to inadequate
remedies for victims. As mentioned above, several studies have been conducted
that demonstrate the frequency with which civil protection orders are violated,
often with tragic results.97 The issuance by courts of orders that are ineffective or
that impose orders that are not complied with by batterers due to a lack of informa-
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Tsai, supra note 11.
91. Id. at 1291-94.
92. Id. at 1292.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. A court, using its discretion in applying protection from abuse statutes and granting
protection orders, may grant some or all of these remedies, depending on what the facts of each
case call for. A court may also, of course, opt not to grant any of the available remedies and deny
petitions for protection orders as it sees fit. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007 (West 1988
& Supp. 2003).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing a 1996 study which found that "60% of orders of protection were violated
within one year (and] another study which found that almost 50% of court-issued protection
orders were violated within two years").
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tion or adequate attention on the part of judges, undermines the ability of courts to
put a stop to domestic violence.
Another significant and frequent criticism made regarding the way courts have
traditionally addressed domestic violence relates to the tension that often exists
between the inherent complexity of domestic violence cases and the limited time
and resources available to most state courts.9 8 As Tsai observes, "[1]arge numbers
of crimes... overwhelm the criminal courts in urban centers." 99 Civil dockets in
state courts are similarly crowded, creating an environment in which "judges must
review a great number of cases in a very limited amount of time." 100 Because of
the complex issues implicated by domestic violence cases, which involve "issues
of family dynamics and emotional relationships between the parties that are un-
characteristic of other crimes," domestic violence cases often require additional
judicial time and attention. 101 Judicial interests in efficiency, however, and the
need for judges to be able to dispose of cases as quickly as possible, often leads to
cursory treatment of these complex and important cases.
Civil protection orders, in particular, demonstrate the complexities and chal-
lenges domestic violence cases often present to the parties and to the courts. Be-
cause of the expedited nature of the hearings, and the minimal discovery con-
ducted, the issues underlying protection order hearings are often not as well devel-
oped as those underlying other types of cases.102 In addition, "[v]ictims often
appear pro se and may have a difficult time navigating the legal system, particu-
larly in light of the fear they may experience of facing the batterer in court.103
[Many] judges express concern over their inability to dedicate sufficient time to
fashion comprehensive protection orders." 1° 4 The result may be a "lack of sup-
port and resources for victims as well as decreased accountability for perpetrators,
ultimately culminating in insufficient methods of confronting the incidence of do-
mestic violence." 105 It is these problems that lie at the heart of the recent charge to
change the ways that courts approach domestic violence cases through the imple-
mentation of specialized judicial programs.
106
Finally, because of the fragmented nature of the criminal justice system, as
discussed by both the Tsai and the Kaye & Knipps articles, domestic violence
cases are often at risk of "falling through the cracks." 107 The criminal justice




102. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The
Truly National and the Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1109 (2001).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1109-10.
105. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1294.
106. See id. at 1296-97. According to Tsai, specialized domestic violence court programs
deviate ... from the traditional approach to domestic violence by representing a more
comprehensive and integrated approach that coordinates a greater variety of commu-
nity resources. The interdisciplinary response is critical to addressing the many men-
tal health and social issues, such as the effects on family, children, finances, and psy-
chological functioning, that are an integral part of domestic violence. The domestic
violence programs developed in Quincy, Massachusetts, New York City, Dade County,
Florida, and the District of Columbia exemplify this approach.
Id. at 1297.
107. See id. at 1293-94. See also Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 5.
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system necessarily depends upon the effective coordination of efforts made by law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, court personnel and judges. When the various
players' levels of motivation, training, and sensitivity to issues surrounding do-
mestic violence are in conflict or are otherwise different, it can lead to ineffective
treatment of domestic violence cases. 108
Although there have been vast improvements in police response to domestic
violence in recent years, efforts made by law enforcement to intervene in reported
cases of domestic violence have historically been characterized as largely indiffer-
ent and ineffective. 109 Up until the late 1980s, police, like judges in traditional
courts, often viewed domestic violence as a private family matter and tended to
assign women's calls low priority. 110 Further, "[w]hen police officers did show up
at the homes of women seeking protection, frequently the police would do little
other than sending a man away to 'cool off' and perhaps take a walk around the
block." 111 Similar attitudes by prosecutors, who were often reluctant or unwilling
to criminally prosecute perpetrators due either to unwillingness by the victim to
cooperate or because of a "strongly [held belief] that society should not intervene
in domestic disputes," 112 often compounded the problem.
Even when law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges cooperatively acknowl-
edge the importance of intervention and make concerted efforts to consistently
arrest and prosecute abusers, incompatible measures taken by each department can
undermine the efficacy of these efforts. When, for example, large numbers of
crimes overwhelm law enforcement offices and criminal courts, and communica-
tion may break down between various departments of the criminal justice system.
This may result in conflicting bail conditions set by courts, or arrests that are made
and not followed through to prosecution. These prosecutorial and law enforce-
ment outcomes can undermine official policies put in place to criminalize domes-
tic violence. 113 When coupled with a still persistent bias among some police,
prosecutors, and judges, there is the potential that the criminal justice system and
traditional court programs will "reinforce traditional approaches to domestic vio-
lence by implying a legal condonation of family violence."
'114
The solution adopted by some courts in New York, and in an increasing num-
ber of jurisdictions around the country, has been the development of specialized
domestic violence courts. These courts unify the adjudication of cases involving
domestic violence and streamline judicial administration and procedures in ways
they hope will improve the quality and effectiveness of the legal system's response
to domestic violence. Judge Kaye has referred to these courts, and the methods
they employ, as "problem solving courts." 115 According to Kaye, the develop-
ment of domestic violence courts, and other similarly innovative judicial programs,
is based upon the recognition that "[a] legal system remains viable only if it re-
108. See Tsai, supra note 11, at 1294; Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 5.
109. See PTACEK, supra note 14, at 46-47.
110. Id. at 46.
111. Id.
112. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1294.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1293-95. See also Judith S. Kaye, Rethinking TraditionalApproaches, 62 ALa.
L. REv. 1491, 1494 (1999).
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sponds to the present-day needs and concerns of the public." 116 In order for "our
legal system to remain vital and strong," says Kaye, "we need advocates of change
to think seriously not only about the exquisite nuances of the law but also about the
hard reality of how our courts are functioning." 117 According to Kaye, specialized
domestic violence courts, by altering court administration and procedures, enable
courts to better identify and solve many of the problems underlying the judicial
system's historically insufficient response to family violence.
III. SPECIALIZED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT PROGRAMS: IMPROVEMENTS TO
THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
Several state courts around the country have adopted specialized domestic
violence court programs in order to more effectively address the sensitive and
complex issues domestic violence cases often involve. 118 The means that these
court programs utilize to improve judicial responses to domestic violence repre-
sent a significant departure from the approach taken by traditional courts. Through
an examination and discussion of existing specialized domestic violence courts
around the country, the precise nature of the judicial action taken in implementing
these programs can be fleshed out and serve as a point of departure for exploring
the applicability of the term "judicial activism" to creative court programs.
Specialized domestic violence court programs currently exist in Quincy, Mas-
sachusetts; New York City; Dade County, Florida; the District of Columbia; Duluth,
Minnesota; and many other jurisdictions. 119 Although the approaches and indi-
vidual procedures of each of these domestic violence courts differ to some degree,
they all have similar objectives and are uniquely positioned to solve the many
problems domestic violence cases have historically presented to more traditional
courts. 
120
Many of the courts listed above employ a "comprehensive interdisciplinary
system of handling domestic violence cases." 12 1 The courts in New York, Massa-
chusetts, and Washington, D.C., as well as others, have joined the criminal and
civil sides of the court docket in order to provide a more integrated approach to the
cases and the litigants that come before them. 122 In the Quincy program, for ex-
ample, in an effort to address the fragmentation problems experienced by many
traditional courts, not only do "[j]udges, clerks, district attorneys, police and pro-
bation officers," work closely with one another, they also work collaboratively
with "social service providers, and community agencies," that provide services to
both the victim and the batterer.
123
116. Kaye, supra note 56, at 853.
117. Id.
118. See Betsy Tsai, supra note 11, at 1296-1309 for a comprehensive treatment of anumber
of these programs nationwide.
119. See id. This is not a complete list of all of the domestic violence court programs around
the country. Tsai's article discusses a number of other important programs. Since her article
was published, there have also been additional court programs implemented around the country,
including the pilot project recently implemented in Maine.
120. See Kaye, supra note 56, at 851.
121. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1302.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1298.
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In addition, by making "domestic violence cases a top priority," many of these
specialized court programs are able to "afford the victim a supportive and rapid
procedural response to her complaint." 124 Through the use of trained court per-
sonnel and cooperating victim advocates, these specialized domestic violence courts
are able to inform a victim about the court process, both in criminal and in civil
protection order cases.12 5 This assistance in negotiating the legal system is par-
ticularly helpful for pro se civil litigants who, without such help, may have previ-
ously been at risk of failing to recognize available remedies or social services
available to them in the community. 126 This educational role, played by courts
when either individual judges or court-recognized victims' advocates act in an
advisory capacity to assist victims, potentially alters and improves the remedial
responses. The shift that this new court participation represents from that com-
prising traditional court models suggests a certain degree of activism not typically
engaged in by courts.
Specialized domestic violence court programs have also been able to address
the responses of law enforcement officers and establish protocols whereby perpe-
trators are more regularly arrested and monitored by courts in both civil and crimi-
nal cases. In some jurisdictions that have implemented domestic violence court
programs, police cooperate with prosecutors' offices regarding arrests and offender
compliance with probation and bail conditions. 127 In Massachusetts, for example,
"[t]he police department uses a 'tracking system' in which they report domestic
violence incidents directly to the District Attorney's Office.1128 This coordination
between different components of the criminal justice system and the efforts made
to share information not only coordinates the efforts of police and prosecutors, it
also allows victim advocates "to adopt a pro-active approach by reaching out and
contacting the women involved" 129 in order to provide them with information on
both the prosecutorial process and the availability of civil protection orders.
130
Yet another improvement to judicial approaches to domestic violence cases
made possible by specialized court programs is the added training and sensitivity
of courts to the unique issues implicated by these cases. In the Dade County,
Florida court program, "family violence training is mandatory, not only for judges,
but also for prosecutors and select public defenders. ' 131 Training judges to be-
come sensitive and respectful of the complex issues involved in domestic violence
cases enables courts to respond to the needs of both victims and batterers in ways
that are ultimately more productive and empowering. 132 nterviews conducted of
women following the disposition of their cases in specialized domestic violence
court programs indicate the positive effects of the kind of training these programs
mandate. 133 When judges and court personnel are familiar with the dynamics of
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1302; Weisman, supra note 14, at 1109.
127. See Tsai, supra note 11, at 1299-1300 (2000).
128. Id. at 1299.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1299-1300.
131. Id at 1303.
132. See id. at 1302-04.
133. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE CoURTRooM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES
175 (1999).
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abuse, and the remedies that they ultimately employ in the disposition of cases
reflect that familiarity, women feel supported and positive about the legal pro-
cess. 134 In addition, the substantive laws created by statute are more uniformly
and productively applied. For example, when judges undergo training mandated
by domestic violence court programs and are made aware, for instance, that "isola-
tion [is] a key tactic that men use to undermine women's resistance," 135 they are
consequently better equipped to help connect her to community resources to com-
bat that isolation. Further, when judges are informed about the importance of
services available to perpetrators they can impose conditions requiring batterers to
undergo court-mandated counseling in order to help combat continued abuse and
recidivism. 136
The approaches taken by specialized domestic violence courts around the coun-
try to try to improve the manner in which domestic violence cases are handled has,
in many ways, addressed many of the problems that Judge Kaye and Betsy Tsai
enumerate in their articles. Through the cooperation of law enforcement, prosecu-
tors, judges, court personnel, and social service providers, the legal system as a
whole is better able to meet the needs of victims, oversee the prosecution and
accountability of batterers, and, to some degree, prevent the possibility that these
cases will fall between the cracks in courts overwhelmed by a large number of
cases. 137 The implementation of specialized domestic violence courts and their





136. See BuZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 2, at 228. "There are several distinct advantages of
court-sponsored treatment interventions, especially as a diversion from the criminal justice sys-
tem or as part of a split sentence." Id. For example,
[t]hey finesse the greatest weakness of the criminal justice system its inability to pre-
vent victims or prosecutors from dismissing charges. By selective use of counseling
as a diversion, the finite resources available in the system may also be more effec-
tively focused on recidivist batterers or cases in which the potential for serious con-
tinued violence appears greatest based on past or current attitudes and behaviors.
Id. In addition,
[p]retrial diversion to counseling is also appropriate in the many instances in which
the judicial sentence would undoubtedly be probation, perhaps coupled with counsel-
ing. In these cases, the ideal is to accomplish behavioral change quickly without
incurring the heavy transactional costs to the judicial system or the necessity of label-
ing the offender as a convicted miscreant risking secondary deviance or costing the
victim and her family.
Id. But see id. at 228-29; Tsai, supra note 11, at 1312-14.
137. Cf. Tsai, supra note 11, at 1309-16 (discussing criticisms of model domestic violence
court programs including the observation that "in the prosecution context, the contrast between
the policy of punishing and reforming abusers and that of supporting and empowering victims
tends to result in mixed messages and contradictory procedures"). Id. at 1311.
138. Betsy Tsai's article gives a comprehensive overview of the courts discussed above and
other specialized domestic violence court programs around the country. She argues that these
courts represent "therapeutic jurisprudence," meaning that domestic violence courts embody
objectives relating to the law's effect on the psychological, physical, and emotional health of
litigants. Id. at 1295. This Comment will not attempt to recreate Tsai's discussion or treatment
of these programs. Instead, this Comment utilizes her research to briefly address efforts being
made by contemporary courts around the country in order to help focus a discussion of current
efforts being made in Maine. It is through a discussion of Maine's domestic violence pilot
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IV. JUDICIAL PROBLEM SOLVING V. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Given the changes that these specialized courts make to traditional judicial
approaches, the question arises whether specialized courts effectuate a departure
so significant that they may be subject to criticisms of inappropriate judicial action
or policymaking. 13 9 The role of courts in American jurisprudence has historically
been that of a neutral arbiter bound by stare decisis and objective rules of law.
1 4 0
On the surface, the emphasis that domestic violence courts place on judicial train-
ing and monitoring of offender accountability appears to conflict with conven-
tional views of proper adjudicatory practices. 14 1 Whether these new practices rise
to the level of conduct that, in other areas of decisional law, have been subject to
accusations of "judicial activism," or whether they simply represent "problem solv-
ing" is an issue that this section will explore.
A. Judicial Problem Solving
Critics of specialized domestic violence courts have argued that these pro-
grams do indeed represent inappropriate policymaking on the part of courts.
1 4 2
The accusation is, perhaps, not all that surprising if one looks critically at the prac-
tices and procedures adopted by these court models. As discussed in the previous
section, domestic violence courts incorporate a level of involvement and insight
into the circumstances surrounding abuse that are notably lacking in more tradi-
tional, transactional litigation. 143 Unlike cases involving contracts or tort claims,
project, as compared with other programs, that this Comment will address the questions of whether
Maine's program is solely an example of judicial problem solving, or whether it may also repre-
sent some form of judicial advocacy. This Comment will not discuss the theory of "therapeutic
jurisprudence," proffered by Tsai in her article. Rather, it will discuss the ability of domestic
violence programs to identify and remedy procedural problems within the legal system, as well
as the potential of innovative court programs to substantively affect the legal remedies available
to victims of abuse.
139. See Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 10 ("Not everyone, of course, agrees that courts
should take a problem solving approach to their caseloads. Some object that it interferes with
courts' core value of neutrality or turns judges into social workers. Others assert that problem
solving is inappropriate 'policymaking' by the judiciary.").
140. Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic
Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1243, 1253-54 (1993). Murphy observes:
Classical legal thought views the law as a science in which legal judgments are made
by applying objective rules to facts and reaching consistent and predictable results.
We are a "government of laws, not men" and adhere to a system of "neutral" laws
which are supposed to ensure fairness and impartiality in the application of the law.
Historically, therefore, legal theorists have viewed any discussion of the reality of
pain and suffering that results from oppressive laws-or the absence of laws-as a
corruption of the lawmaking process. Injection of such emotion, they claim, would
produce chaos and irrationality in the rule of law.
Id.
141. See Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 10.
142. Id.
143. See Paul Michael Hassett, Expanding the Role of the Courts, N.Y. ST. B.J., March/April
2001, at 5. Hassett observes: "Besides deciding cases of daunting complexity, the justice sys-
tem has, in recent times, been asked to assume jurisdiction over problems that are not readily
resolvable in a system originally designed to handle relatively straightforward matters such as
basic contracts and tons." Id. at 5. He goes on to say that "[t]he inability of the traditional
system to deal with many of these problems has, at least in New York State, led to... 'problem-
solving courts."' Id. at 6.
[Vol. 56:2
WHO'S AFRAID OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM?
domestic violence cases implicate issues relating to the dynamics of the parties'
relationships with one another. 144 Judges, by adapting the ways in which courts
handle these sensitive cases, have undertaken to acknowledge the complexity of
domestic violence cases and to alter their approaches with a new emphasis on
education and counseling of offenders and on victim safety. 145
The practice of some courts, for example, of informing victims of available
sources of judicial intervention represents a more active role than that typically
played by judges. 146 In many cases not involving domestic violence, the respon-
sibility for providing information on which legal avenues to pursue falls on the
legal representative for each party. Because many domestic violence litigants,
both victims and batterers (at least in civil cases), appear pro se,1 47 the potential
for missed opportunities is increased. Having judges take on the task of educating
parties in a domestic violence case about the mechanics of the judicial process
helps mitigate the confusion that otherwise might arise. It also, however, suggests
a level of engagement with the process and the litigants that might potentially be
viewed as being outside the purview of traditional judicial action.
In addition, the extensive training undertaken by many judges who are as-
signed to specialized domestic violence courts facilitates increased analysis and
consideration of the issues underlying these kinds of cases. 148 By informing judges,
through training, about the power dynamics at play in many domestic violence
cases, 149 specialized court models enable judges to alter the disposition of cases to
address the underlying needs and vulnerabilities of the parties. 150 Again, this sort
of judicial involvement is unlike that seen in less volatile cases such as those in-
volving contracts or tort claims.
In response, Chief Judge Judith Kaye of New York has defended domestic
violence courts as representative of problem-solving rather than inappropriate ju-
dicial activism. 15 1 By way of establishing her "judicial problem solving" argu-
144. See PTACEK, supra note 14, at 168-84; Murphy, supra note 15, at 1263-64.
145. See Murphy, supra note 15, at 263-65.
146. See Weissman, supra note 14, at 1109-11.
147. Id. at 1109.
148. See PrACEK, supra note 14, at 168-84.
149. See id. for a discussion of the psychology underlying domestic abuse. Ptacek discusses
"'The Power and Control Wheel' designed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project in Duluth,
Minnesota." Id. The Wheel illustrates how "power and control, rather than physical injury, is
made the central element of battering. Violence, which includes sexual violence, serves to hold
together these tactics of control, which occur in battering relationships more often than physical
assaults, draw their power from violence and the threat of violence." Id. at 172. He goes on to
discuss the ways that judges, ignorant of the underlying dynamics of abuse, "intentionally and
unintentionally, may be reinforcing the power of men who batter, and thus furthering women's
entrapment." Id. at 173.
150. Based on an understanding of the dynamics of abusive relationships, specialized court
programs in Quincy strive
to make domestic violence cases a top priority by using an approach that accom-
plishes the goals of controlling the abuser and empowering the victim. The abuser is
thus subject to a number of increased sanctions, including aggressive prosecutorial
tactics, greater monitoring of defendant behavior, and a general emphasis on enhanced
enforcement strategies, while the victim enjoys a process made easier by various vic-
tim/witness advocates and greater availability of support resources.
Tsai, supra note 11, at 1298.
151. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 2.
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ment, Kaye poses the following series of questions: "What is the responsibility of
a court in dealing with a case of domestic violence? Is it to serve as a passive
adjudicator of the issues presented by the parties, concerned only that the case is
legally resolved? Or is there a larger role for a court to play in crafting a meaning-
ful intervention that may change future behavior?" 152 Before answering these
questions she probes still further and asks, "what is the responsibility of a court
system with respect to the subject of domestic violence? Should it view domestic
violence as a serious social problem that courts can and should help solve?" 153
By way of an answer to these questions, Kaye argues that the role of courts is
to "provide more complete justice" by "taking a more active approach, by working
to foster communication among all the players [and] ... help[ing] to build a justice
system that better responds to the needs of all citizens." 154 Rather than overreach-
ing and entering into inappropriate policymaking, Kaye argues that specialized
domestic violence courts operate "within a sphere that is unquestionably within
the purview of the courts: how to put the resources that have been allocated to
[them] to their best and most effective use."' 155 Problem solving courts, in her
mind, are effectuating "nothing more than sound court administration."
156
According to Kaye, therefore, the procedures by which courts and individual
judges become involved more fully in domestic violence cases are nothing more
than examples of proper streamlining of court time and resources. Yet, given the
potential for these newly adopted court procedures to affect the substantive out-
comes of domestic violence cases when, for example, more complete support or-
ders are made in a divorce involving an abusive marriage, it becomes possible to
argue that these procedures represent more than simply "court administration."
Indeed, in some ways specialized court programs suggest conduct that has taken
on a role so "activist" in nature that it may appropriately be labeled judicial activ-
ism. In light of the controversy and suspicion that often surrounds the term judi-
cial activism, however, it is perhaps not surprising that many proponents of do-
mestic violence courts shy away from such a connection.
The next section will explore popular notions of judicial activism and the ways
that it may be a more appropriate way to conceive of the work being done to stop
domestic violence across the country through the implementation of specialized
domestic violence courts. In doing so, this discussion starts with a recognition of
the typically negative connotations accompanying the term judicial activism. By
attempting to unpack the controversy surrounding the term and trying to under-
stand how it has conventionally been applied to judicial conduct, however, this
section will ultimately argue that judicial activism is not an inherently evil prac-
tice. Instead, it sometimes represents appropriate judicial action which facilitates
the proper application of substantive laws to complex, shifting social problems.
But what, exactly, is judicial activism? What do we mean when we reference
a particular brand of judicial conduct or decision making and identify it as an
example of judicial activism? The term, characterizing various forms of judicial
action, is one that is, in many ways, difficult to pin down. References to judicial
152. Id. at 1.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 11-12.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Id.
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activism abound and are regularly invoked not only by members of the bench and
bar, but also by legal commentators, scholars, and members of the popular me-
dia. 157 The motivations for, and tone of these references, however, are largely
inconsistent.
Moments of judicial activism may be praised on one hand and denounced on
the other. Judicial activism may garner accusations of improper partiality or unau-
thorized policymaking on the part of a judge. 158 In contrast, judicial activism may
invite praise for a judge's having affected a just result or furthered a necessary
change in the application of the law. In other words, cries of judicial activism and
an understanding of the meaning behind them are often dependent upon context,
upon exactly what is being criticized and, more important, who is offering the
criticism. Therefore, the precise meaning of the phrase, and any definitive under-
standing or consensus about whether judicial activism is inherently good or inher-
ently evil, seems to be lacking.
B. Judicial Activism: A Framework
Definitions of judicial activism abound, yet the term, characterizing various
forms of judicial action, defies precise, definitive characterization. For some, the
term judicial activism may be invoked to denounce "a court's willingness to strike
down laws, to depart from the authority of text, history, and/or precedent, [or] to
announce sweeping rules."'159 It may be seen as a tool improperly utilized by
courts to "reach out to decide issues not properly before the [c]ourt, or to impose
intrusive remedial orders on political actors."' 160 For others, judicial activism may
not hold negative connotations and may, instead, be used to reference an important
judicial function, the exercise of which is not only positive but, in some circum-
157. See, e.g., Jessica Reaves, They Who Must Decide: The Florida Supreme Court, TIME
ONLINE EDITION, at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,88402,00.html (Nov. 15,
2000). This article discusses the makeup of the Florida Supreme Court and its involvement in
the 2000 presidential election ballot controversy. Id. According to Reaves, the Florida court,
which is almost entirely made up of Democratic appointees, has a "reputation for what conser-
vatives call 'judicial activism."' Id. See also, Ed Magnuson, Right Turn Ahead?, TIME MAGA-
ZINE, July 30, 1990, at 16 (discussing the retirement of Justice Brennan from the Supreme Court
in 1990, Magnuson states that "[w]ith the abrupt resignation of Justice William Brennan, the
court that Chief Justice Earl Warren led into an age of liberal judicial activism passed into his-
tory.").
158. See Thomas Jipping, Judicial Activism Run Amok, WORLD NET DAILY, at http://
www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=28120 (June 28, 2002). In this article,
Jipping discusses the June 26, 2002 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in which it "concluded that 'the statement that the United States is a nation "under God," in the
Pledge of Allegiance as recited by public school students is an endorsement of religion."' Id.
(quoting Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002). In observing
that the "Ninth Circuit [has] struck again," Jipping states: "these judicial extremists have ruled
that the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional. Not surprising for that court, but it is an
inevitable result of the judicial activism rampant throughout the federal bench." Id.




stances, proper. 16 1 Those who have recognized the propriety of some forms of
judicial activism typically limit their approval to judicial action which "polic[es]
the boundaries of power between the jurisdictional government entities within our
system," 162 and mitigates the consequences that might otherwise flow from "an
act of one of the other branches of government [that] goes beyond the power granted
to that branch by the Constitution, or is in conflict with some provision of the
Constitution." 163
One definition, provided by Black's Law Dictionary, which may be useful in a
general discussion of judicial activism, is that it denotes a "philosophy of judicial
decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy,
among other factors, to guide their decisions, usu[ally] with the suggestion that
adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing
to ignore precedent." 164 This definition emphasizes the application, or perhaps
misapplication, of substantive law in a manner befitting an individual court or
judge's personal predilections. According to this definition, judicial activism does
not seem to relate most often to procedural matters, but rather to distinct decisions
made on the merits. The meaning and scope of this definition is largely in line
with other definitions proffered by various legal scholars who similarly point to
substantive decision making in judicial activism analysis.
16 5
The sort of judicial conduct most frequently attracting accusations of judicial
activism, whether positive or negative, tends to be that involving constitutional
analysis conducted by appellate courts. The United States Supreme Court, above
161. See id. at 1172. Young argues that "'activism'-broadly conceived as an important role
for courts in relation to the other branches in the interpretation and enforcement of constitu-
tional norms-is consistent with a particular form of conservative political theory." Id. Young
later goes on to say that for some conservatives, who, according to him, typically decry judicial
activism when it disregards precedent, "an 'active' judicial role in reviewing and checking the
actions of the political branches and the state governments," may well be favored. Id. at 1207.
He argues that so long as courts, in taking an "active" role, "act in small steps so as to disrupt as
little of the status quo as they can," judicial activism can be consistent with productive and
proper judicial conduct. Id. at 1206-07. For example, a court may take small steps when it is
narrowly interpreting a "highly ambitious and rationalistic legislative scheme," in order to tem-
per its ambition.
162. Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 141, 144-45 (2001-2002).
163. Id. at 144.
164. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 850 (7th ed. 1999). There are countless other definitions that
seek to provide a general framework for a discussion of judicial activism. See, e.g., Lino A.
Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial Activism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 296
(1996) (stating that judicial activism is "the practice by judges of disallowing policy choices by
other governmental officials or institutions that the Constitution does not clearly prohibit)."
165. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1139, 1144-1161 (2002). In this article, Young surveys "six broad categories of judicial behav-
ior that probably strike most of us as 'activist' in some ways." id. at 1144. They are: "(1)
second-guessing the federal political branches or state governments; (2) departing from text
and/or history; (3) departing from judicial precedent; (4) issuing broad or 'maximalist' holdings
rather than narrow or 'minimalist' ones; (5) exercising broad remedial powers; and (6) deciding
cases according to the partisan political preferences of the judges." Id. Young's discussion of
each of these "activist" categories illustrates the substantive nature of much of the judicial be-
havior he discusses. With the exception, perhaps, of the use of "broad remedial powers," all of
the categories highlight judicial decisions made on the merits. There is almost no mention made
of judicial activism arising out of procedural processes.
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all others, seems to be the penultimate target of such accusations. 166 As such, the
term judicial activism has become widely, if not exclusively, associated with sub-
stantive decisions on issues relating to the edicts of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. 167 Substantive decisions by the Supreme Court garnering accusations of
judicial activism date back even to Marbury v. Madison,168 which involved the
Court's decision in 1803 "striking down legislation passed at the federal and state
levels. ' ' 169 That decision, which endured labeling as improperly activist, "met
with varying degrees of acceptance and criticism.",170 More recently, the Court's
substantive due process decisions during the Lochner Era, 17 1 its subsequent rever-
sal of those decisions, 172 and its decisions dealing with access to contraception
173
and abortion, 174 have also been attacked as judicial activism. 
175
The emphasis on judicial conduct relating to substantive matters in discus-
sions of judicial activism has not, however, entirely precluded an application of
the term to procedures utilized by courts or judges. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has itself delivered opinions containing internal accusations traded
166. See, e.g., id. at 1139. Young stated that "[iut is very much in vogue these days to accuse
the current Rehnquist Court of 'conservative judicial activism."' Id. Young then goes on to
quote several legal scholars who have asserted that "'[w]e are now in the midst of a remarkable
period of right-wing judicial activism,"' and "' If]or nearly a decade,'... 'the court's five con-
servative justices have steadily usurped the power to govern by striking down or weakening
federal and state laws regulating issues as varied as gun sales, the environment, and patents-as
well as laws protecting women and now the disabled."' Id. at 1139-40 (quoting first, Cass R.
Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001 at A23; and second, Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court v. Balance of Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A23).
167. See, e.g., Young, supra note 165, at 1139; Jones, supra note 162.
168. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
169. Jones, supra note 162, at 141.
170. Id.
171. The "Lochner Era," comprised the string of Supreme Court decisions beginning with
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and continuing through the mid-1930s when the Court
reversed its position and began to repeatedly insist "that it has turned its back on the Lochner
philosophy," and the substantial judicial intervention that era embodied. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
& GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 466 (14th ed. 2001).
172. Beginning with Nebbia v. New York, the Court began to change course on its economic
substantive due process jurisprudence. Id. at 473. In that case, contrary to the analysis compris-
ing the Lochner Era decisions, the Court upheld a New York State law allowing fixed "'mini-
mum and maximum... retail prices to be charged by ... stores to consumers for consumption
off the premises where sold."' 291 U.S. 502, 515 (1934). In rejecting a due process challenge,
the Court observed that "[w]ith the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practi-
cability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to
deal." Id. at 537.
173. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut
criminal statute which provided that "[a]ny person who uses any drug, medicinal article or in-
strument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or
imprisoned ... or both," on the ground that the statute violates the substantive due process right
to privacy implied in the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution). Id. at 480.
174. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (striking down a Texas law forbidding the
procurement of an abortion except "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," on the
ground that the right of personal privacy, implied by the Due Process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment, though not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, prohibits such state regula-
tion of abortion). See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
175. Id. at 528-29.
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between individual justices of judicial activism in relation to procedural, rather
than substantive, analysis.
In Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,176 decided by the Supreme
Court in 1993, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, took Justice O'Connor to
task for proposing an alternative disposition in her dissenting opinion (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist) which Justice Scalia regarded as improper judicial activ-
ism. 177 In Harper, federal employees appealed the Supreme Court of Viginia's
decision denying their requests for refunds of taxes paid on retirement benefits. 
178
The employees argued that an earlier case decided by the Court, authorizing simi-
lar tax refunds, 179 applied retroactively to their claims and as such, their requests
should be granted. 180 The Supreme Court of Virginia had denied the employees'
requests, saying that the rule of law relied on by the employees applied prospec-
tively only. 181 In rejecting that analysis, the majority and concurring opinions in
Harper averred that "' [b]oth common law and our own decisions [have] recog-
nized a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this
court.' 182
In vacating and remanding the state court's decision, the majority held that the
Supreme Court's "application of a rule of federal law to the parties before the
Court requires every court to give retroactive effect to that decision." 183 Justice
O'Connor, in her dissent, argued that the Court's decision "applie[d] a new rule of
retroactivity," 184 that controverts stare decisis and that "[w]hen the Court changes
its mind, the law changes with it."
'185
In rebutting O'Connor's point, Justice Scalia argued that the assertion that the
law changes with the decisions of the Court is "quite foreign to American legal and
constitutional tradition." 186 According to Scalia, it is "'the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is,' not what the law shall be." 187 In
Scalia's mind, "prospective decisionmaking," 188 of the sort recommended by
O'Connor in her dissent and exercised by the Supreme Court of Virginia, has his-
torically been "known to foe and friend alike as a practical tool of judicial activ-
ism, born out of disregard for stare decisis." 
189
Although the Supreme Court seems to be particularly prone to association
with the term judicial activism, just as the term is not solely reserved for criticism
of substantive decisional law, it is likewise not solely reserved for discussions
176. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
177. Id. at 105-09.
178. Id. at 91.
179. Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
180. Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. at 91.
181. Id. at 91-92.
182. Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. at 94 (quoting Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505,
507 (1973)).
183. Id. at 90.
184. Id. at 113.
185. Id. at 115 (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991)).
186. Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. at 106-07.
187. Id. at 107 (quoting Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
188. Id. at 107.
189. Id. at 107-08.
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relating to the Court. Indeed, depending on the context and character of other
judges' decisions, their conduct that is either outside the scope of their immediate
adjudicatory roles, or within the context of procedural applications in particular
cases, might also be appropriately labeled "activist." It is in these contexts that the
term judicial activism is most easily applied to judicial establishment of, special-
ized domestic violence court programs, or to judicial conduct within them.
For example, judges involved in the Dade County Domestic Violence Court in
Florida have adopted both an adjudicatory and a pedagogical role in the courtroom
and in the greater community with respect to issues relating to domestic violence. 190
Through that court program, "the role of 'judge as teacher' in the courtroom is
tested, and judges have a responsibility to make public appearances at community
meetings and in the popular media and to educate the public about the court and
about domestic violence."
191
At least one scholar has referred to Dade County judges' behavior as being
representative of judicial activism. 192 In doing so, no distinction was made be-
tween the substantive judicial decision-making central to conventional notions of
judicial activism and the more explicit activism engaged in through extra-judicial
community education. 193 Similarly, as mentioned above, Judge Kaye, in a discus-
sion of New York's domestic violence courts, acknowledged that the streamlining
and specialization of court procedures relating to domestic violence cases have
been regarded by some critics as examples of "inappropriate 'policymaking' by
the judiciary." 194 Such references to policymaking are typically synonymous with
cries of inappropriate judicial activism. 195
The suggestion that creative court programs, such as specialized domestic vio-
lence courts or drug treatment courts, 196 which to some degree alter the proce-
190. See JEFFREY FAGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
PROMISES AND LIMrrs 22 (1996).
191. Id.
192. See, Tsai, supra note 11, at 1303.
193. See id. (citing FAGAN, supra note 190, at 21). Tsai observes that the Dade County Do-
mestic Violence Court, "in an attempt to create a more effective response to domestic violence,
was designed with three main areas of focus: judicial activism in the community, batterer treat-
ment and victim services." Id.
194. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 10.
195. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial Activism, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 296 (1996).
196. Drug treatment courts have been implemented around the country. Maine's drug court
program is, in many ways, representative of the general framework of these kinds of programs.
According to the State of Maine Judicial Branch website, Maine's Adult Drug Court is:
a special court given the responsibility to handle cases involving drug-using offend-
ers through comprehensive supervision, drug testing, treatment services and immedi-
ate sanctions and incentives. Drug court programs bring the full weight of all inter-
veners (judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, substance abuse treatment specialists,
probation officers, law enforcement and correctional personnel, educational and vo-
cational experts, mental health workers and many others) to bear, forcing the offender
to deal with his or her substance abuse problem. Drug courts work similar to a court
diversion program in that, in exchange for a guilty plea a client may enter the drug
court and following drug court graduation expect a greatly reduced sentence. While
in drug court clients are allowed to remain in the community while being supervised
by various drug court staff.
at http://www.courts.state.me.us/mainecourts/drugcourt/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
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dural and organizational formulas utilized by more traditional courts, may repre-
sent some form of judicial activism is provocative. To classify court programs
such as drug courts or specialized domestic violence courts as examples of judicial
activism, given the controversy and suspicion that term engenders, is to suggest, at
least implicitly, that those programs and the role of the judges who preside over
them are notably different from more traditional courts. The distinction raises
interesting questions about the comparative role of judges in these different kinds
of courts, about the manner in which procedural and substantive law is applied,
and about the quality and efficacy of the respective results. If one regards drug
courts or specialized domestic violence courts as involving something other than
traditional, objective judging-namely, some form of advocacy--does it necessar-
ily follow that the judicial work that is being done in these courts is somehow not
as valuable or solid as that done in traditional courts? Is the application of law and
precedent somehow different?
As was seen in the above discussion of existing domestic violence court pro-
grams around the country and the analysis proffered by Judge Kaye, it is possible
to regard these courts as representative only of procedural streamlining and effi-
cient court administration. If however, the term judicial activism is removed from
the controversy along with the suspicion that has historically surrounded it, these
court programs can be regarded as representative of appropriate judicial advocacy.
Judges, through increased training, community involvement and education, and
more sensitive application of existing laws effectuate different, more meaningful
remedies for victims of domestic violence.
Through their role as "active case manager[s], creative administrator[s], and
community leader[s]," 197 judges are able to affirm the experience of victims, hold
batterers accountable, and "restore a sense of justice to women who have been
brutalized and terrorized." 198 While it has been traditionally considered inappro-
priate for courts to act with an eye toward affecting social change through judicial
activism, in domestic violence cases, activism has remedied long-standing short-
falls in the way that the legal system addresses these important cases. As the
following discussion of Maine's new court will show, judicial activism, as prac-
ticed by specialized domestic violence courts, effectuates important changes in the
ways that courts operate and in the ways that judges apply substantive laws.
V. SPECIALIZED COURT PROGRAMS IN MAINE: MAINE'S PILOT DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PROJECT
In July and August of 2002 the State of Maine District Court system launched
a Pilot Domestic Violence Project in the district courts in York and Portland. That
opening day marked the culmination of years of research and planning conducted
by a state-sponsored, multi-agency committee created to study the prevalence and
impact of domestic abuse in Maine. The induction of the pilot project, which is
funded in part through federal grants obtained by the district court system, also
marked the beginning of an ambitious and proactive collaborative journey under-
taken by a coalition of community and government agencies to improve Maine's
197. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 10, at 12.
198. PTACEK, supra note 14, at 160.
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response to family violence. The pilot project, and the objectives it embodies, was
conceived of and developed in response to findings by the committee and other
cooperating agencies that domestic violence is a widespread problem facing Maine
courts, 199 one that the district courts200 have largely been unable to meaningfully
redress.
The Pilot Project is the result of funding obtained through a STOP Violence
Against Women Fund Grant (STOP Grant) Application, 20 1 submitted by former
Chief District Court Judge Jon Levy.202 The grant application was supported by
letters from several representatives of the various arms of the State's criminal jus-
tice system including the Cumberland and York County District Attorneys203 and
199. The number of civil protection from abuse petitions has increased substantially over the
last several years. STOP Grant, supra note 9, at 4. In 1982, the first year for which filing data
is available, 1574 PFA petitions were filed. Id. That number went up to 3978 in 1990 and in the
year 2000 the District Court system saw 6545 complaints filed. Id. These numbers reflect a
400% increase in PFA complaints over an 18-year period. Id. According to the grant applica-
tion, "[tihe dramatic increase in the civil domestic violence docket... has not been met with a
corresponding increase in resources." Id.
200. "The Maine District Court has jurisdiction over criminal complaints involving domestic
assaults and violations of protective orders, as well [as] jurisdiction over civil complaints seek-
ing protection from abuse." Id. at 1.
201. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, which oversees the pro-
gram and funding describes the STOP Violence Against Women Formula Grant program as
follows:
The STOP (Services * Training ' Officers * Prosecutors) Violence Against Women
Formula Grant Program (STOP Programs) promotes a coordinated, multidisciplinary
approach to improving the criminal justice system's response to violent crimes against
women. The STOP Program encourages the development and strengthening of effec-
tive law enforcement and prosecution strategies to address violent crimes against
women and the development and strengthening of victim services in cases involving
violent crimes against women. The STOP Program was authorized under the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) and reauthorized and amended by the
Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (VAWA 2000). The STOP Program is adminis-
tered by the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW)....
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office on Violence Against Women,
STOP Violence Against Women Formula Grant Program, available at http:/Iwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/
vawo/stop._grantdesc.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
202. Jon D. Levy "was confirmed as an Associate Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court in 2002. [He] previously served as the Chief Judge of the District Court." Maine Judicial
Branch, Supreme Court Justice Biographies, at http://www.courts.state.me.us/mainecourts/su-
preme/justices.bios.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
203. The letter from Michael P. Cantara, District Attorney for York County, appended to the
grant application states that "(f]or York County, the implementation of a domestic violence case
management pilot project would help fill a void." He goes on to say that "Southern York County
traditionally has been underserved in terms of resources for victims of domestic violence," and
that the implementation of "an all-inclusive approach is thought to be the best way of keeping
victims safe, and offenders accountable." STOP Grant, letter from Michael P. Canara, supra
note 9, at 21. Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney for Cumberland County similarly writes:
"[b]etter coordination of information will lead to more effective prosecution of domestic vio-
lence offenders, increased safety for victims, and more informed sentencing of offenders." STOP
Grant, letter from Stephanie Anderson, supra note 9, at 26. She further observes that "[p]ost-
conviction monitoring by the court of domestic violence offenders will serve to hold these of-
fenders more accountable, and strengthen our community's coordinated response to domestic
violence." Id.
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the Director of Caring Unlimited, a victims' advocacy organization. 204 According
to the grant application, one of the primary concerns necessitating a coordinated
domestic violence project is an often disjointed approach to case management within
the court system. 205 The application states:
The effectiveness of the Judiciary's response to domestic violence is hampered
by insufficient coordination in the scheduling and sharing of information between
the District Court's criminal domestic violence docket on the one hand, and the
civil protection from abuse docket on the other. It is apparent that the Judiciary's
response to domestic violence cases can be substantially enhanced by a coordi-
nated effort to manage the cases in a unified manner.
206
Appended to the grant application is a report, authored by Emily Sack, an
attorney hired to advise the Violence Intervention Project, which identifies and
suggests means of addressing gaps within Maine's judicial system.207 The report
was the result of Ms. Sack's observations of court proceedings in the Portland
district court and her discussions with various participants in Maine's judicial sys-
tem, including judges, district attorneys, bail commissioners, defense bar, clerks,
and law enforcement.
208
Sack's report identifies a number of problem areas that are consistent with
problems identified earlier in this Comment and that have been found in other state
courts around the country. Some of those problem areas are identified below, along
with a discussion of the ways in which the Pilot Project intends to address them.
209
Several areas requiring improvement were included in Sack's report. 210 This dis-
cussion, however, will focus on three broad categories: information systems, law
enforcement, and offender monitoring. These three areas of concern, and the meth-
ods undertaken by the Pilot Project to address them, are particularly demonstrative
of the departure the domestic violence project makes from traditional court pro-
grams in Maine. As such, they serve as a good point of departure for exploring
whether these examples of proactive procedural remedies represent a manifesta-
tion of judicial activism.
204. Caring Unlimited is a community agency based in York County which provides coun-
seling, safety planning services and legal aid to victims of domestic violence. In her letter of
support for the grant application, Mary S. Marsters, Legal Services Coordinator states: "As a
legal advocate at Caring Unlimited... I frequently see women thrust into a complex and confus-
ing legal system as a result of the violence of a partner. Consequently they are sometimes left
homeless, many with young children, and nearly all in financial difficulty." She goes on to say
that "[d]omestic violence cases, civil or criminal, are generally complex and difficult. They
require special handling and expediency in order to ensure victim safety and participation. A
protocol that is attentive to these issues will greatly enhance victim safety, advance the success
of prosecution and increase the accountability of the perpetrator." STOP Grant, letter from
Mary S. Marsters, supra note 9.
205. STOP Grant, supra note 9, at 1.
206. Id.
207. Emily J. Sack, Esq., Report on Cumberland County Domestic Violence Coordinated
Response, 3 (2001) [hereinafter Sack Report] (on file with Maine Law Review).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 102.
210. Id. at 2.
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A. Information Systems
1. Problems
One significant problem area identified by Sack's report is the "lack of com-
prehensive information systems, both providing computerized data for individual
courts and agencies and providing linkages among key agencies. '2 11 According
to her report, the lack of a comprehensive system for storing and sharing informa-
tion "is impacting the ability to make informed decisions regarding bail, pleas,
sentences, conditions, and protection from abuse orders."
2 12
The State of Maine has only recently begun to develop a computerized data-
base of protection from abuse orders. 2 13 This database, when fully functional,
will contain a catalog of all protection from abuse orders issued by courts, indicat-
ing the parties involved, the issuing court, and the individual conditions attached
to them.2 14 At the time of Ms. Sack's report, however, the database only contained
protection orders dating back one year.2 15 While court personnel had been enter-
ing data into the system, they did not yet have access to the database in order to
review the information contained within it.2 16 This significantly increases the
likelihood that a judge, unaware that a criminal defendant has a protection order
against him, will set a conflicting probation condition or fail to include a strict
condition in a protection order because she is unaware that the defendant has a
history of battering the petitioner.
The database, when fully operational, will allow those with access to deter-
mine, for example, whether an individual with a protection order issued against
him is prohibited from having contact with a victim, whether he is permitted to
possess firearms, or whether he is permitted to live at a shared residence. This
information, if contained in a comprehensive, widely accessible database, has the
potential to make "an enormous impact, by providing law enforcement, prosecu-
tors, and judges with at least part of the domestic violence history between the
parties" and "is a great step in development of an effective [domestic violence]
response ."
2 17
Another problem identified in Sack's report that related to the sharing of in-
formation was the limited "ability of the court or the district attorney to get prior
criminal history or 'rap' sheets." 2 18 While individual courts are able to "produce
a history of convictions from the county," they are currently unable to access "state-
wide or national data" regarding an individual's prior convictions. 2 19 Courts are
therefore largely unable to determine whether an individual has been previously
convicted of domestic abuse in another county or state. This information might
impact decisions relating to bail or sentencing.
211. Id. at 3.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See STOP Grant, supra note 9, at 5; Sack Report, supra note 207, at 1-2.
215. See Sack Report, supra note 207, at 3.
216. Id. at 4.
217. Id. at 3.





The problems relating to the storage and sharing of protection order and criminal
histories are primarily the result of limited judicial resources. 220 The completion
of the database and expansion of access to all major players within the legal sys-
tem is largely dependent upon available time and money. Despite Sack's urging,
without additional resources, the Pilot Project is largely incapable of expediting
the time when the database becomes fully operational. The Pilot Project, since its
inauguration in July, has, however, attempted to draft protocols that address the
problem to the extent possible without new resources.
2 21
Under the proposed protocols, specialized domestic violence clerks are asked
to inquire into the background and protection order history of petitioners and de-
fendants, "and to the extent possible, the court and location of other proceedings,"
both in Maine and in other states. 2 22 This will allow the domestic violence clerk
or other court personnel to contact those offices when necessary to obtain further
information. 223 In addition, procedures are being implemented which require clerks
to identify criminal domestic violence cases prior to transfer to the superior court
upon a defendant's request for a jury trial.224 Clerks are instructed to stamp a file
with a "DV" label prior to transfer in order to identify it as part of the Pilot Project
so that the hearing may be expedited and returned to the district court for monitor-
ing with as little delay as possible.225 Also, law enforcement officers are being
asked to conduct criminal and protection order checks on all domestic violence
defendants upon arrest and to provide that information directly to bail commis-




In addition to the difficulties presented by the lack of any comprehensive,
widely accessible database, Ms. Sack also identified several problems relating to
the manner in which law enforcement agencies respond to domestic violence.
227
According to Sack, and many of those whom she interviewed, one point of par-
ticular concern is the existing bail process and procedures: "The initial bail hear-
ing is one of the most significant stages in the handling of a domestic violence
220. See STOP Grant, supra note 9, at 2.
221. See generally Domestic Violence Pilot Project Draft Protocol (Aug. 2002) (on file with
Maine Law Review). The protocols cited throughout this section relate primarily to the response
drafted and implemented by the York County Division of the Pilot Project. The protocols imple-
mented in Cumberland County differ somewhat but are similarly geared toward addressing the
concerns raised by Sack in her report. The differences in the approach and methods of the York
and Cumberland Counties reflect the unique challenges faced by courts serving larger areas
(Cumberland) and those serving smaller communities (York).
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id.
224. See ld. at 2.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 5.
227. Sack Report, supra note 207, at 5-7.
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case. A defendant's release after arrest is one of the most dangerous periods for the
victim. It is[, therefore,] crucial that, while protecting defendant's due process
rights, bail decisions are made in as informed a manner as possible. '228 At the
time of Sack's report, it appears as though there were significant gaps in the infor-
mation being relayed to bail commissioners prior to the making of decisions re-
garding preconviction release.2 2 9 Because of the problems with accessing crimi-
nal and protection from abuse histories, "one of the few sources of information
available to the commissioners is information regarding the immediate incident
leading to the arrest. It is therefore crucial that law enforcement communicate this
information either personally or in the form of an arrest report to the commission-
ers immediately."
2 3 0
According to Sack, and those she interviewed, little communication between
police and bail commissioners was consistently taking place for several reasons:
First, in some departments police reports are not written up immediately, and so
are not ready at the time of the bail hearing. Second, due to logistics, the police
officers transporting the defendant to jail (and therefore the officers in contact
with the bail commissioner) are not necessarily the officers making the arrest,
and therefore may not have adequate information regarding the incident....
Third, in some instances, officers transporting the defendant, whether or not they
are the arresting officers, may not be present when the commissioner appears, so
there is not information transmitted about the incident. Fourth, in some instances
the bail commissioners themselves are not present, but are making decisions by
telephone, and apparently do not view paperwork that is [available to them].
23 1
2. Solutions
The Pilot Project has, through continued cooperation and collaboration be-
tween law enforcement, prosecutors, the defense bar, victims advocates, and the
court, been able to address some of the problems highlighted in Sack's report.
Under the new protocol, and pursuant to an amendment to the Maine Bail Code
adopted by the legislature, 2 3 2 bail commissioners must make a "good faith" in-
quiry into the circumstances surrounding an alleged abuser's arrest prior to admit-
ting them to bail. 2 3 3 In order to aid an arresting officer's ability to conduct a
228. Id. at 6.
229. Id. at 5-6.
230. Id. at 5.
231. Id. at 5-6.
232. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1023(4) (West 2003). This new section amends the
responsibilities of bail commissioners and law enforcement in cases involving domestic vio-
lence. Pursuant to section 1023(4)(C), a bail commissioner may not:
In a case involving domestic violence, set preconviction bail for a defendant before
making a good faith effort to obtain from the arresting officer, the district attorney, a
jail employee or other law enforcement officer: (1) A brief history of the alleged
abuser; (2) The relationship of the parties; (3) The name, address, phone number and
date of birth of the victim; and (4) Existing conditions of protection from abuse or-
ders, conditions of bail and conditions of probation.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1023(4)(C) (West 2003). Additionally, under the new amendment,
law enforcement officers are to implement new policies, no later than June 1, 2003, that, among
other things, contain procedures for conducting a risk assessment of the defendant and protocol
for relaying that "information to a bail commissioner before a bail determination is made." Id.
233. Id.
2004]
thorough background check after making an arrest, law enforcement officers are
now to inquire into whether the parties have "lived in another part of Maine or any
other state so ... that checks may be run for any domestic violence cases."
234
Further, arresting officers, under the new protocol, are to fax or deliver domestic
violence worksheets (produced through the police department) and record checks
to the jail when delivering a prisoner.235 This will expedite information sharing
between law enforcement and bail commissioners so that bail decisions are made
in as informed a manner as is possible. Finally, the guidelines provided by the
Pilot Project protocol call for heightened involvement by law enforcement in vic-
tim safety. Under the new procedures, law enforcement is to notify the victim of a
domestic assault if her batterer is being released on preconviction bail and notify
her of any conditions of release. 236 This notification requirement is designed to
ensure that a victim has time to take steps to ensure her safety when a defendant is
entitled to release on preconviction bail.
C. Offender Monitoring
1. Problems
One point of particular concern mentioned in Sack's report was the lack of
any judicial monitoring of offenders' compliance with conditions of pre-trial re-
lease or post-conviction probation. 237 Prior to the Pilot Project, pre-disposition
conditions such as attendance at batterer's intervention programs were rarely im-
posed. 238 Sack attributed this to the fact that several judges rotated the court's
handling of domestic violence cases. 23 9 As a result, there was little opportunity
for a single judge to become familiar with individual cases and keep track of whether
defendants were in compliance with court orders. 240 Due to a lack of resources,
defendants who were able to make bail were not subject to monitoring to any sig-
nificant degree and had "virtually no conditions placed on them."'24 1 Similarly,
post-conviction conditions were routinely overseen by probation officers with little
or no involvement of the court after final disposition. 242 With regard to the issue
of offender monitoring, Sack revisited the lack of information sharing and the fre-
quent lack of knowledge on the part of judges regarding protection orders and
criminal histories of parties in domestic violence cases. 243 She suggested that
unifying the process and assigning a single judge to domestic violence cases might
assist the court system in better tracking defendant compliance with court orders.244
234. Domestic Violence Pilot Project Draft Protocol at 5 (Aug. 2002) (on file with Maine
Law Review).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 6.
237. Sack Report, supra note 207, at 9.
238. See id. at 13.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 11, 15.
241. Id. at 13.
242. See id. at 9-10.
243. Id. at 15.
244. Id. at 22.
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2. Solutions
The grant application submitted by the district court cites research that "indi-
cates that [there is] a substantial increase in compliance with batterers' program
requirements when mandatory court monitoring is in place." 245 Therefore, in an
effort to increase the frequency with which offenders meet court ordered condi-
tions of release, the Pilot Project has instituted a judicial monitoring process.
246
This process involves a court calendar, set by judges and clerks cooperatively,
whereby offenders who are ordered to attend batterer education programs or com-
ply with other conditions return to court and provide proof of their compliance to
the judge. According to the protocol, having one judge to oversee domestic vio-
lence cases and monitor offenders through periodic judicial reviews facilitates con-
sistent compliance and immediate sanctioning in the event of noncompliance.
Batterer education programs and probation officers collaborate with judges by sub-
mitting reports regarding offender compliance with court orders. An offender's
failure to comply may result, when appropriate, in revocation by a court of proba-
tion or bail conditions.
247
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Judicial activism has long been suspected of being representative of judicial
overreaching or inappropriate policymaking. In some circumstances, however,
activism on the part of the judiciary is necessary in order to overcome larger social
structures or biases that preclude meaningful legal action. With regard to cases
involving domestic violence, an area of law that has historically been plagued by a
judicial culture that undervalues the experiences and rights of victims, activism on
the part of courts and judges has played a critical role in improving the application
of laws that are meant to sanction domestic abuse.
Specialized domestic violence courts, through the reorganization of court re-
sources, increased training and sensitivity of judges, and cooperation among com-
munity agencies, are examples of appropriate and necessary advocacy being done
by the judicial system. Maine's new pilot domestic violence project and the changes
it has effectuated within the State for victims and perpetrators of domestic vio-
lence demonstrates the critical role that the legal system, and individual judges,
must play in stopping the violence. These court programs, in Maine and through-
out the country, represent a new framework for understanding judicial activism.
Through increased involvement, understanding, and active attention to the com-
plexities surrounding domestic violence cases, domestic violence courts and "ac-
tivist" judges will ensure that the legal system remains viable and consistently able
to deliver "complete justice" to those it serves.
Jennifer Thompson*
245. STOP Grant, supra note 9, at 6 (citing Webber, Domestic Violence Courts, JOURNAL OF
THE CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN AND THE COURTS at 32 (2000)).
246. See Domestic Violence Pilot Project Draft Protocol at 4 (Aug. 2002) (on file with Maine
Law Review).
247. Id. at 7-8.
* The inspiration for this Comment came through my experience working as a Bernstein
Fellow with the Honorable Joyce A. Wheeler of the Maine District Court. I would like to take
this opportunity to extend my thanks to Judge Wheeler for her generous support and guidance
throughout this process and for serving as a truly invaluable mentor.
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